190 Conn. App. 186
Conn. App. Ct.2019Background
- Parties divorced by uncontested judgment (June 14, 2011) that incorporated a separation agreement requiring full disclosure of assets on financial affidavits and providing that a material omission permits reopening/reforming the judgment and entitles the non‑omitting party to 75% of the undisclosed asset plus fees.
- Defendant moved to open the judgment alleging plaintiff failed to disclose (1) a Jerusalem condominium (conveyed to plaintiff in 1999) and (2) a First Niagara savings account opened in plaintiff’s name in 2008 (balance ~$92,432 as of April 28, 2011).
- Court held hearings (2016–2017), credited defendant’s evidence and expert testimony, found the plaintiff knowingly failed to disclose both assets, valued undisclosed assets at $238,811, and ordered payment of 75% ($179,109), prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees/costs.
- Plaintiff appealed, challenging (1) that omissions were not “material” (arguing defendant knew of assets and that omitted value was immaterial), (2) award of prejudgment interest raised first in defendant’s posthearing brief, and (3) award of postjudgment interest entered after appeal (claiming violation of automatic appellate stay).
- Appellate court affirmed: trial court’s factual findings were supported; nondisclosure duty is party’s obligation regardless of opposing party’s suspicions; omitted assets were not de minimis; prejudgment interest was equitable remedy properly raised and awarded; awarding postjudgment interest during an appeal did not violate the automatic stay because the ruling did not enforce the judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiff’s failure to list the Jerusalem property and Niagara bank account on financial affidavit constituted a “material omission” under the separation agreement | Lavy: Omission not material because Brown knew (or suspected) of assets pre‑dissolution and the omitted value was trivial relative to the ~$16M estate | Brown: Agreement imposed fiduciary duty of full disclosure; omissions of ~$238K affected distribution rights and triggered contractual remedy | Affirmed: trial court reasonably found omissions material; defendant did not have definitive knowledge pre‑judgment; omitted value not de minimis |
| Whether trial court’s finding that plaintiff knew about Niagara account was clearly erroneous | Lavy: No proof he knew (no evidence statements were delivered to him) | Brown: account‑opening paperwork bore plaintiff’s signature and he never closed it; he could have learned balance with due diligence | Affirmed: sufficient evidence supported finding plaintiff knew or should have known of account |
| Whether prejudgment interest could be awarded though requested first in defendant’s posthearing brief | Lavy: Denied fair notice and opportunity to defend on interest claim | Brown: Interest is equitable element of damages; plaintiff could respond in posthearing reply | Affirmed: prejudgment interest may be raised in posthearing submissions; plaintiff had opportunity to respond; award discretionary and proper here |
| Whether trial court violated automatic appellate stay by awarding postjudgment interest after appeal filed | Lavy: Award of interest equates to enforcement of money judgment and is stayed by Practice Book §61‑11 | Brown: Postjudgment interest protects prevailing party’s monetary right and ruling does not execute or carry out the judgment | Affirmed: awarding interest did not effectuate enforcement (no execution/foreclosure); court retained jurisdiction to decide motion; plaintiff’s appellate rights preserved |
Key Cases Cited
- Billington v. Billington, 220 Conn. 212 (1991) (heightened duty of full and frank financial disclosure in dissolution proceedings)
- Reville v. Reville, 312 Conn. 428 (2014) (standard of review for motions to open judgment)
- Rheaume v. Rheaume, 156 Conn. App. 766 (2015) (deference to trial court factual findings on reopening judgments)
- O'Brien v. O'Brien, 326 Conn. 81 (2017) (scope of appellate review of domestic relations property divisions)
- McRae v. McRae, 129 Conn. App. 171 (2011) (trial court’s credibility assessments and factual findings accorded deference)
- Westport Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Westport Transit Dist., 235 Conn. 1 (1995) (prejudgment interest may be raised posttrial where opposing party had opportunity to respond)
- Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. EI Constructors, Inc., 239 Conn. 708 (1997) (prejudgment interest is equitable and discretionary; requires unlawful detention of money)
- Picton v. Picton, 111 Conn. App. 143 (2008) (courts may award interest in domestic relations cases as equitable remedy)
- Sosin v. Sosin, 300 Conn. 205 (2011) (§ 37‑3a meant to compensate deprivation of use of money, not punish)
- Sikorsky Fin. Credit Union, Inc. v. Butts, 315 Conn. 433 (2015) (interest under § 37‑3a may include prejudgment and postjudgment interest)