Lavonta Montreal Bland v. Commonwealth of Virginia
0937161
| Va. Ct. App. | Nov 14, 2017Background
- In August 2013 Lavonta M. Bland and his brother committed shootings; one victim died and another was seriously injured.
- Bland was arrested in North Carolina on September 9, 2013 and served with Virginia warrants on October 3, 2013 charging second-degree murder, malicious wounding, firearm offenses, and felon-in-possession.
- A grand jury returned a first set of direct indictments on October 16, 2013 charging first-degree murder, aggravated malicious wounding, robbery, conspiracy, and firearm offenses; Bland was arrested on those indictments October 22, 2013.
- The general district court nolle prosequied the original warrants November 25, 2013; the circuit court denied Bland’s November 4 motion to dismiss the indictments.
- The Commonwealth nolle prosequied the first indictments in March 2014; a second set of direct indictments charging the same offenses was returned April 2, 2014.
- Bland was tried, convicted, and sentenced to 98 years; he appealed claiming denial of a preliminary hearing and violation of statutory and constitutional speedy-trial rights.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Bland was denied a preliminary hearing under Va. Code § 19.2-218 | Commonwealth: no denial because final prosecution was by direct indictment after initial warrants/indictments were nolle prosequi | Bland: entitled to preliminary hearing on the original arrest warrants before direct indictment returned | Court: No. §19.2-218 applies only when indictment is returned on a charge for which defendant was arrested; here the operative charges were different and prior warrants/indictments were nolle prosequi |
| Whether Bland’s statutory and constitutional speedy-trial rights were violated | Commonwealth: clock runs from April 2014 direct indictments; interruptions were mostly defendant-requested or tolled, so no statutory or constitutional violation | Bland: clock should run from his initial arrest/earlier indictments, producing excessive delay and prejudice | Court: No. Time ran from April 2014 indictments; trial commenced within statutory period (with excusable tolling); constitutional Barker factors do not show presumptive prejudice or harm |
Key Cases Cited
- Webb v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 24 (1963) (§19.2-218 applies only when indictment follows an arrest on that felony charge)
- Triplett v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 649 (1973) (defendant entitled to preliminary hearing on initial charges before indictment on those charges)
- Waye v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 683 (1979) (no denial of preliminary hearing where defendant was not arrested on the later charged offense)
- Arnold v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 218 (1993) (nolle prosequi of warrants "clears the slate" so a later indictment does not require earlier preliminary hearing)
- Wright v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 690 (2008) (no preliminary hearing required when original charges were nolle prosequi before direct indictment)
- Ashby v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 540 (2000) (nolle prosequi and subsequent re-indictment restarts speedy-trial clock)
- Herrington v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 181 (2016) (confirming that direct indictment can be pursued in lieu of arrest/ preliminary hearing)
- Harris v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 576 (1999) (speedy-trial calculation restarts after nolle prosequi and re-indictment)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four-factor test for constitutional speedy-trial claims)
