Lavin v. Rednour
641 F.3d 830
7th Cir.2012Background
- Lavin, an Illinois prisoner, was tried bench-wise for attempted murder, aggravated battery, and aggravated battery of a senior citizen.
- The victim, 81-year-old Costello, sustained extensive, permanent injuries; an eyewitness identified Lavin as the attacker and DNA on Lavin’s boots matched Costello.
- Lavin claimed mistaken identity and tried to help Costello; the eyewitness description contradicted Lavin's account.
- The trial court found Lavin had specific intent to kill based on his size/age disparity and the three stomps, one deemed rage-driven, constituting attempted murder.
- Lavin received a 40-year sentence for attempted murder, extended beyond the 30-year max due to the victim’s age (over 60).
- Lavin pursued state postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance for not pursuing voluntary intoxication; counsel favored mistaken identity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Evidence sufficiency for intent to kill | Lavin argues no evidence of specific intent to kill. | State asserts circumstantial proof supports intent from attack and injuries. | Evidence reasonably supported intent to kill; Jackson standard satisfied. |
| Apprendi step in sentencing | Apprendi violation by increasing sentence beyond statutory max without proper factfinding. | Bench trial, and age-based enhancement properly found beyond reasonable doubt; other issues procedurally barred. | No Apprendi violation; age fact found beyond reasonable doubt; some arguments procedurally barred. |
| Ineffective assistance for not raising voluntary intoxication | Counsel should have pursued voluntary intoxication as a defense. | Defense strategy favored mistaken identity; intoxication would not have altered outcome and conflicted with other defenses. | Strickland standard met; no deficient performance or prejudice shown. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1980) (sufficiency review asks whether any rational trier could convict)
- Hopp, 805 N.E.2d 1190 (Ill. 2004) (specific intent may be inferred from circumstances)
- Nelson v. Thieret, 793 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1986) (inference of intent from disparity in size/strength)
- People v. Williams, 649 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. 1995) (circumstances may prove specific intent to kill)
- Mack v. McCann, 530 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 2008) (Apprendi applies to sentencing if facts increase max sentence)
- Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 2006) (Apprendi considerations in state bench trials)
- Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006) (harmless-error standard for flawed sentencing factfinding)
- Escamilla v. Jungwirth, 426 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2005) (collateral attacks based on the petitioner’s testimony)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) (AEDPA standards for reviewing state-court decisions)
