Laviage v. Fite, 47 F.4th 402

Dennis Laviage is president/CEO of C&D Scrap Metal; Texas law requires scrap dealers to send electronic transaction reports to the Texas Department of Public Safety (TxDPS).
C&D used the Scrap Dragon software to transmit reports; after a 2015 update Scrap Dragon sometimes failed to send state (TxDPS) reports but continued sending city reports to Leads Online.
Houston Police Sgt. Jesse Fite learned of the discrepancy in August 2015, found ~24 unfiled TxDPS reports, and swore an affidavit that omitted any mention of the Scrap Dragon software malfunction.
An assistant district attorney charged Laviage; he was arrested, tried, and acquitted by a jury in August 2018; the prosecution record was later expunged.
Laviage sued Fite under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a Franks-based Fourth Amendment violation for materially omitting exculpatory facts from the affidavit; the district court denied qualified immunity; this appeal followed.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding (1) the omitted software glitch was not material to probable cause because Laviage knew the system was failing and did not use available alternatives, and (2) in any event the right was not clearly established.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Fite's omission of the Scrap Dragon malfunction from the affidavit violated the Fourth Amendment under Franks (i.e., was a material omission made knowingly or recklessly)?	Omission was material; had the affidavit disclosed the glitch it would not have supported probable cause.	Even if omitted, the facts (24 missed reports, Laviage knew of glitches and did not use fax alternative) supported probable cause; omission not material.	Held for Fite: omission not material—an objectively reasonable officer could conclude probable cause existed.
Whether the alleged Franks violation (if any) was a clearly established constitutional right such that Fite is not entitled to qualified immunity?	The violation was "obvious" and therefore no on-point precedent required.	No controlling precedent squarely governs these facts; law not clearly established.	Held for Fite: right was not clearly established; qualified immunity applies.

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (establishes test for false statements or material omissions in warrant affidavits).
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity framework and interlocutory appeal standard).
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (objective standard for qualified immunity).
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (clarifies the ‘‘clearly established’’ prong for qualified immunity).
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (probable cause inquiry assesses probabilities in context).
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (need for on-point precedent to overcome qualified immunity).
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (obviousness can overcome absence of closely similar precedent in extreme cases).
Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52 (2020) (obvious constitutional violations can preclude qualified immunity without materially similar precedent).
Melton v. Phillips, 875 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2017) (Franks liability may be premised on knowing, intentional omissions).
Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270 (5th Cir. 2021) (Franks rationale extends to arrest warrants).
Davis v. Hodgkiss, 11 F.4th 329 (5th Cir. 2021) (elements of a Franks claim).
Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2020) (plaintiff must identify precedent to establish right is clearly established).