213 Conn.App. 463
Conn. App. Ct.2022Background
- Lavette was hired as a store attendant whose duties included spray and brush painting; he initially used a respirator provided by a coworker.
- Kim Derin, the employer’s safety manager, told Lavette after ~1 month that he was not authorized to use the respirator; Lavette thereafter developed recurrent symptoms and was hospitalized; OSHA investigated and fined the employer.
- Lavette sued Stanley Black & Decker alleging the employer deliberately instructed him to work in dangerous conditions, that his injuries were substantially certain to result, and that the conduct was wilful and serious—invoking the intentional tort exception to the Workers’ Compensation Act exclusivity provision (§ 31-284).
- His theory rested on the allegation that Derin was the employer’s alter ego (complete and final authority to remove the respirator / made safety policy) so her intentional misconduct could be attributed to the corporation.
- The trial court repeatedly struck prior pleadings and ultimately struck the fourth amended complaint with prejudice, concluding the allegations alleged only ordinary supervisory authority and legal conclusions, not the domination required to pierce the corporate veil.
- The Appellate Court affirmed: plaintiff failed to plead the instrumentality or identity factors needed to treat Derin as an alter ego and did not plead employer-authorized intentional tort; two arguments offered on appeal were unpreserved or inadequately briefed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of alter ego allegations to invoke the intentional-tort exception | Lavette: Derin had "complete and final authority" over respirator use and made safety policy, so she was the company's alter ego for this transaction | Stanley Black & Decker: Allegations describe routine safety-manager duties, not the complete domination/unity of interest required to pierce the corporate veil | Allegations insufficient; they show ordinary supervisory control, not the domination or unity required under instrumentality/identity tests |
| Whether allegations were impermissible legal conclusions | Lavette: statements about corporate unity and binding the company are factual enough | Defendant: those are conclusory legal assertions not admitted on motion to strike | Court: bald assertions (no separate mind/will) are legal conclusions and need factual support; not accepted on motion to strike |
| Reconsidering alter ego doctrine for large corporations | Lavette (on appeal): courts should revisit alter ego rule as applied to larger corporations | Defendant: bound by existing Supreme Court precedent; issue not raised below | Court declined to reconsider—issue not preserved and appellate court bound by Supreme Court precedent |
| Applicability of employer-authorized intentional-tort pathway (Patel footnote) | Lavette (argued on appeal): alternative route exists if employer directly committed or authorized the tort | Defendant: plaintiff never pleaded or argued employer authorization below; not part of record | Court: Plaintiff never alleged employer authorization; issue was not pleaded or adequately briefed, so court declined to consider it |
Key Cases Cited
- Jett v. Dunlap, 179 Conn. 215 (Conn. 1979) (establishes narrow alter-ego exception to workers’ comp exclusivity: corporation liable only if actor is employer’s alter ego or employer authorized assault)
- Patel v. Flexo Converters, U.S.A., Inc., 309 Conn. 52 (Conn. 2013) (clarifies that the alter-ego test is stringent, supervisory title alone is insufficient, and sets out instrumentality and identity formulations; notes separate employer-authorized-intent exception)
- Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 242 Conn. 255 (Conn. 1997) (applies Jett and requires that both the causing action and the resulting injury be intentional or substantially certain for the intentional-tort exception)
- Driscoll v. General Nutrition Corp., 252 Conn. 215 (Conn. 2000) (reaffirms that workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy when the act covers the injury)