Lavender v. State
203 So. 3d 969
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Byron Lavender was convicted of burglary of a dwelling with assault and sentenced to prison, community control, and probation.
- The written probation included two contested special conditions: (17) maintain an hourly daily activity log; (19) submit to electronic monitoring and pay $5.50/day for monitoring.
- Lavender filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b) motion arguing the special conditions should be stricken because the trial court failed to orally pronounce them at sentencing.
- The trial court granted Lavender’s motion but did so after the 60-day window set by rule 3.800(b)(2)(B), rendering that order a nullity under Williams v. State.
- The panel examined whether oral pronouncement was required and whether Lavender’s procedural 3.800(b) challenge sufficed to obtain relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the daily activity log condition (special condition 17) required oral pronouncement | Lavender: condition not orally pronounced; must be stricken | State: procedural remedy via rule 3.800(b) suffices; no substantive challenge | Court: Log is not authorized by statute and required oral pronouncement; but Lavender raised only procedural objection via 3.800(b) and received that procedural avenue, so no relief granted |
| Whether requiring payment for electronic monitoring (part of condition 19) required oral pronouncement | Lavender: payment term was not orally pronounced and must be stricken | State: electronic monitoring is a standard condition; procedural challenge under 3.800(b) available | Court: Monitoring itself is standard, but charging the probationer has no statutory authority and required oral pronouncement; nonetheless, because Lavender raised only a procedural objection and had 3.800(b) process, no relief granted |
| Whether the trial court’s late corrective order under rule 3.800(b) (beyond 60 days) was effective | Lavender: court’s post-60-day order attempted to correct sentencing errors | State: late order is nullity per precedent | Court: Order granting motion was a nullity because it was issued outside the 60-day rule 3.800(b)(2)(B) window (citing Williams) |
| Whether remand is required to strike unpronounced special conditions when a defendant uses rule 3.800(b) | Lavender: remand needed to have trial court strike conditions | State: procedural remedy via 3.800(b) removes need for remand | Court: Following Ladson, defendants may raise such objections under rule 3.800(b) and procedural due process is satisfied; remand not required when only procedural objection is raised |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. State, 67 So. 3d 249 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (orders correcting sentencing errors issued after rule 3.800(b) time period are nullities)
- Ladson v. State, 955 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (adoption of rule 3.800(b) permits procedural challenges to probation conditions without oral pronouncement)
- Grubb v. State, 922 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (rule 3.800(b) provides remedy for challenging probation conditions)
- Martinez v. State, 841 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (recused by Ladson)
- Crowley v. State, 813 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (recused by Ladson)
- Miller v. State, 809 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (recused by Ladson)
- Luby v. State, 648 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (pre-rule 3.800(b) cases requiring remand to correct unpronounced conditions)
- Vinyard v. State, 586 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (pre-rule 3.800(b) precedent cited regarding unpronounced conditions)