Lavar L. Thomas v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
89A04-1705-CR-1104
| Ind. Ct. App. | Dec 29, 2017Background
- Defendant Lavar L. Thomas was tried by jury for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon (bifurcated), dealing in cocaine, and dealing in a narcotic drug; jury began deliberations on Feb. 24, 2017.
- During deliberations Juror No. 4 sent a note stating she felt she “may be threatened by the family or girlfriend” of the defendant and that she knew them but not Thomas.
- The court individually voir dired Juror No. 4 (under oath); she said she had voiced her concern to the other jurors and hoped nothing bad would happen, but did not ask the court to act.
- Defense moved for a mistrial; the court individually questioned all jurors and the alternate under oath; each juror acknowledged Juror No. 4’s comment but stated it did not affect their decision or decision-making.
- The court replaced Juror No. 4 with the alternate, sent the jury back to deliberate, and the jury reached guilty verdicts on the charged counts; Thomas was sentenced to 14.5 years.
- On appeal Thomas argued the court erred in denying mistrial motions, in removing Juror No. 4 during deliberations, and in failing to instruct the jury about the reason for removal; the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Thomas) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of mistrial was erroneous after juror’s comment about possible threats | The court rebutted any presumption of prejudice by individually questioning jurors and getting sworn assurances that deliberations were not affected | Juror No. 4’s comment tainted the jury and entitled Thomas to a mistrial / presumption of prejudice under Ramirez | Denial not an abuse of discretion; jurors and alternate sworn they were unaffected, rebutting prejudice presumption |
| Whether removal of Juror No. 4 during deliberations was improper | Replacement was warranted to protect juror safety and integrity of process; removal did not prejudice deliberations | Removal after deliberations began implicates unanimity right (Riggs); court lacked a developed record showing necessity and precautions | Removal was within discretion: circumstances (juror fear) justified replacement, and record showed no prejudice or impairment of jury rights |
| Whether court erred by not instructing the jury about reason for juror’s removal | Instruction unnecessary here because juror was removed for safety concerns, not for views about the case; less explanation was appropriate | Failure to instruct could signal to jurors that removal reflected approval/disapproval of views, possibly prejudicing deliberations (per Riggs) | Argument waived on appeal for failure to contemporaneously object; court also found instruction not required under these facts |
| Whether presumption of prejudice (Ramirez) applied and was unrebutted | State: no evidence of extrajudicial contact; even if presumption applied, jurors’ sworn statements harmlessly rebutted it | Thomas: Juror’s disclosure to other jurors warranted presumption of prejudice and shifted burden to State to show harmlessness | Court: Ramirez presumption not triggered by extrajudicial contact here; in any event State rebutted prejudice via juror attestations |
Key Cases Cited
- Ramirez v. State, 7 N.E.3d 933 (Ind. 2014) (describes when a presumption of jury prejudice arises from extrajudicial contact and allocation of burden to State)
- Riggs v. State, 809 N.E.2d 322 (Ind. 2004) (limits removing a juror after deliberations begin; requires careful record and precautions to avoid prejudice)
- Bunting v. State, 854 N.E.2d 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (explains waiver by failure to contemporaneously object to trial court action)
- Durden v. State, 83 N.E.3d 1232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (related authority on juror removal; noted in briefing and pending transfer)