Lavalais v. Village of Melrose Park
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 21682
| 7th Cir. | 2013Background
- Lavalais is the Village of Melrose Park Police Sergeant, the department’s only Black officer.
- He filed EEOC charges in 2010 and January 2011 alleging race discrimination and retaliation for prior complaints.
- In February 2011 he was promoted to sergeant and placed on the midnight shift; in April 2012 he requested a shift transfer which Chief Pitassi denied.
- In July 2012 Lavalais filed a second EEOC charge claiming disparate treatment and prolonged midnight assignment due to race; a right-to-sue letter followed.
- The district court dismissed all claims; Lavalais appealed seeking reversal on race discrimination and related § 1983 and Equal Protection theories.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the denial of a transfer claim is timely and properly pleaded | Lavalais alleged denial of a transfer; amended pleading supports this | Defendants contend the transfer denial is not properly pleaded and time-barred | Denial of transfer adequately pleaded and timely under related conduct |
| Whether the denial of transfer constitutes a materially adverse employment action | Denial of transfer and midnight duties diminished authority and duties | Purely lateral transfer generally not actionable; need for a material adverse action | Yes, the denial/indefinite midnight assignment can be materially adverse |
| Whether § 1983 race-discrimination claim requires a materially adverse action | Race discrimination under § 1983 should mirror Title VII with adverse action | § 1983 claim requires a different standard; no adverse action recognized | § 1983 race-discrimination claim requires a materially adverse action and survives |
| Whether the hostile work environment claim was properly dismissed | Amended complaint supports hostile environment theory | No facts suggesting hostile environment in EEOC pleadings | Dismissed for lack of fair suggesting hostile environment |
Key Cases Cited
- McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2011) (requires specific facts to support claims; more detail for complex claims)
- Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013) (race-discrimination claims require plausibly pleaded facts show basis for relief)
- Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 2008) (like/related to EEOC allegations may extend to non-charge claims)
- Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1994) (like or reasonably related to EEOC charge standards)
- Moore v. Vital Prods., Inc., 641 F.3d 253 (7th Cir. 2011) (charges must be like or reasonably related to allegations)
- Oest v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs., 240 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2001) (materially adverse action standard for employment claims)
- Porter v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2012) (materially adverse changes may include diminished responsibilities)
- Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (U.S. 2008) (class-of-one in public employment context distinguishes claims)
- Rodgers v. White, 657 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2011) (Title VII and § 1983 race-discrimination standards align)
- Power v. Summers, 226 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2000) (retaliation claims under § 1983/First Amendment distinctions)