Laurie Wood v. United States
845 F.3d 123
4th Cir.2017Background
- Laurie Wood, a Norfolk sheriff’s deputy, was injured jumping from a Navy mock-ship onto mats at the Naval Support Activity Hampton Roads; separated mats caused a fall that rendered her paraplegic.
- The Navy permits civilian law-enforcement training on military facilities under 10 U.S.C. §§ 372–376 and internal policies; civilian agencies must provide a Range Safety Officer who is "solely responsible for the safety."
- Wood alleged the Navy negligently failed to (1) secure a top pad to prevent mat separation, (2) inspect the mock-ship/mats, and (3) warn invitees of the hazard; her administrative claim was denied.
- The United States moved to dismiss under the FTCA’s discretionary function exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a); the district court granted dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
- Wood sought Rule 59(e) relief to conduct jurisdictional discovery (citing Kerns), which the district court denied; she appealed the dismissal and denial of discovery.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Navy’s maintenance/inspection/warning decisions are excluded by the FTCA discretionary function exception | Wood: These are ordinary premises-liability duties (no discretion); Congress waived immunity for such negligence | Gov’t: Decisions about safety, inspection, warnings for civilian use of military facilities involve judgment tied to military policy and resource allocation; exception applies | Held: Exception applies — Navy decisions involved judgment and were grounded in policy, so FTCA waiver does not cover the claim |
| Whether any statute, regulation, or policy mandated the challenged conduct (Berkovitz step one) | Wood: No controlling directive exists; thus conduct is not discretionary | Both parties: agree no specific command exists; absence of a mandatory rule means choice was involved | Held: No statute/regulation prescribed specific maintenance/inspection/warning steps, so the conduct involved choice |
| Whether the choices were based on public-policy considerations (Berkovitz step two / Gaubert) | Wood: The conduct is too "run-of-the-mill" to be protected; allowing protection would swallow premises liability | Gov’t: Statutes and internal policy create an overarching policy balancing civilian training, military preparedness, and costs; decisions implicate policy | Held: The statutory and internal policy framework shows policy considerations (military preparedness, cost, safety); decisions are protected by the discretionary function exception |
| Whether Kerns required jurisdictional discovery on authorization/use of the mock-ship | Wood: Authorization is a jurisdictional fact inextricable from merits; discovery should be allowed | Gov’t: Authorization is a merits issue irrelevant to the discretionary-function jurisdictional inquiry | Held: Kerns inapplicable; authorization is a merits fact and not necessary to decide application of the discretionary-function exception, so denial of discovery was not an abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Berkovitz ex rel. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988) (establishes two-step test for discretionary function: choice and policy grounds)
- United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) (presumption that discretionary acts authorized by policy are grounded in public policy; focus on objective nature of conduct)
- Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) (sovereign immunity principles and limits on suit against the United States)
- Baum v. United States, 986 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1993) (agency maintenance/replacement decisions can be discretionary and policy-driven)
- Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2009) (jurisdictional facts inextricably intertwined with merits may warrant discovery; distinguished here)