Laurie Ray Hamlett v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline
538 S.W.3d 179
| Tex. App. | 2017Background
- Laurie Ray Hamlett, an attorney, was publicly reprimanded by the trial court for violating Texas Disciplinary Rules 8.02(a) and 3.02 (among others) and appealed claiming legal insufficiency of the evidence.
- The core factual dispute involved motions to recuse Municipal Court Judge Scott E. Kurth; Hamlett filed ~31–32 recusal motions, none granted.
- In a recusal motion Hamlett alleged Judge Kurth’s ‘‘disdain’’ would prevent him from granting deferred adjudication to her clients; at trial Hamlett acknowledged that deferred dispositions had been granted in her cases.
- The Commission produced evidence charging that Hamlett made false or recklessly false statements impugning a judge’s integrity (Rule 8.02(a)) and that she filed an unfounded recusal motion on the day of trial to delay proceedings and secure a plea deal (Rule 3.02).
- Hamlett argued on appeal that Rule 8.02(a) required clear-and-convincing proof, but in the trial court she had conceded the Commission must prove violations by a preponderance of competent evidence. The appellate court reviewed sufficiency under the traditional legal-sufficiency standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hamlett) | Defendant's Argument (Commission) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the evidence legally sufficient to prove a Rule 8.02(a) violation (false or recklessly false statement about a judge)? | Statement was not proven false by clear and convincing evidence; insufficient to sustain discipline. | Hamlett accused Judge Kurth of bias despite evidence he granted deferred dispositions to her clients; the record supports reckless or knowingly false statements. | Yes. Evidence was legally sufficient to support a Rule 8.02(a) violation. |
| Did Hamlett unreasonably delay litigation in violation of Rule 3.02 by filing an ill-founded recusal motion to obtain a continuance/plea negotiations? | The recusal motion was a legitimate litigation position. | The motion was filed on trial day to delay trial and procure a plea; this unreasonably delayed resolution. | Yes. Evidence supported a Rule 3.02 violation. |
| What standard of proof/appl. standard of review governs this disciplinary appeal? | Appellant contended Rule 8.02(a) required clear-and-convincing proof and thus a heightened appellate review. | Disciplinary proceedings are governed by the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure requiring proof by a preponderance; appellant failed to preserve any claim for a higher standard. | Preponderance governs; traditional legal-sufficiency review applied and appellant failed to preserve a challenge to a higher standard. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101 (Tex. 2014) (clarifies distinction between "more than a scintilla" and clear-and-convincing standards)
- In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002) (describes appellate review when burden is clear and convincing)
- Thawer v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 523 S.W.3d 177 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.) (disciplinary proceedings governed by disciplinary rules and their proof standards)
- Darby v. N.Y. Times Co., [citation=""] (No official reporter citation in opinion—omitted) (discusses reckless standard: statements made with high degree of awareness of probable falsity)
- Mansions in the Forest, LP v. Montgomery Cty., 365 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. 2012) (policy for preserving error and giving trial courts first opportunity to correct alleged errors)
- Izen v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 322 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (a single rule violation is sufficient to support disciplinary sanction)
(Note: The opinion also cites some unpublished or non-reporter authorities; the Key Cases list above includes only authorities with official reporter citations.)