LAURENCE S. SCHNEIDER and STEPHANIE L. SCHNEIDER v. FIRST AMERICAN BANK, etc.
21-0571
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Mar 9, 2022Background:
- In 2006 Laurence Schneider (husband) executed a 10-year HELOC note; Stephanie Schneider (wife) did not sign the note and was not named a "Borrower."
- Both spouses executed a mortgage on a Boca Raton residence to secure the note. Husband later defaulted.
- Bank filed foreclosure in 2016 naming both, but the verified complaint and the 2017 motion for summary judgment sought a money judgment and any deficiency judgment only against Laurence (the husband).
- At the summary-judgment hearing the bank’s counsel expressly conceded any deficiency would be against the husband only. Schneider (wife) did not oppose the motion.
- After a partial appellate remand, the bank changed theories and argued the mortgage made the wife jointly and severally liable; the trial court entered a joint-and-several deficiency against both spouses for $1,547,391.54.
- The Fourth District reversed, holding the court could not enter a personal deficiency against the non-borrowing spouse when the pleadings, motion, and counsel’s concession sought relief only against the husband.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a deficiency judgment could be entered against the non-borrowing wife when pleadings and summary-judgment motion sought it only against the husband | Bank: mortgage language makes wife jointly and severally liable for any deficiency; court may enter deficiency against both | Wife: she was not a borrower, pleadings never sought personal money or deficiency judgment against her; due process/pleading limits bar surprise relief | Court: Reversed — judgment against wife void because relief granted was not requested in pleadings nor tried by consent |
| Whether the bank’s motion for summary judgment and counsel’s concession bound the bank from later pursuing a different theory of liability against the wife on remand | Bank: later theory justified; Keenan allows separate deficiency action or different pleading | Wife: motion did not state that theory; concession and pleading specificity requirements prevent shifting positions | Court: Bank was bound — motion and concession limited requested relief; Keenan distinguishable because no new separate action with appropriate pleading here |
| Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to award relief not requested in pleadings | Bank: court can award relief consistent with justice/merits | Wife: court lacks jurisdiction to grant relief beyond pleadings; granting unpled relief violates due process | Court: Trial court lacked authority to grant relief outside pleadings; reversal required and remand to enter deficiency only against husband |
Key Cases Cited
- Aluia v. Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., 205 So. 3d 768 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (foreclosure is in rem and does not impose personal liability absent pleadings)
- Stockman v. Downs, 573 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1991) (modern pleading requirements protect against unfair surprise)
- Wachovia Mortg. Corp. v. Posti, 166 So. 3d 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (trial court cannot award relief not requested in pleadings or tried by consent)
- Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Reyes, 126 So. 3d 304 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (judgment granting relief outside pleadings is void)
- Bank of Fla. in S. Fla. v. Keenan, 519 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (separate deficiency action at law may proceed despite foreclosure complaint not seeking a deficiency)
- Moore v. Trevino, 612 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (error to grant relief not sought by pleadings)