Lauren Houston v. Country Club, Inc.
887 F.3d 1270
| 11th Cir. | 2018Background
- Andrea Mickles sued Country Club under the FLSA alleging misclassification of workers and brought a collective action; discovery began August 22, 2014, with a motion deadline of September 22, 2014.
- Three employees (Houston, McAllister, Lemon) filed written consents to opt in to the suit on June 11 and August 26, 2014.
- Mickles moved for conditional certification on May 14, 2015—almost eight months after the local-rule deadline—so the district court denied the motion as untimely.
- The district court later issued a clarification stating the opt-in filers never became party plaintiffs because conditional certification was not granted.
- The named plaintiff settled with Country Club; the district court approved the settlement and entered final judgment, after which the opt-in employees appealed the conditional certification denial and the clarification order.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed denial of conditional certification for untimeliness, held the opt-ins were party plaintiffs upon filing consents, vacated the clarification order (which had the effect of dismissing them with prejudice), and remanded with instructions to dismiss them without prejudice or proceed on their individual claims; it also awarded statutory tolling from the dates each consent was filed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether filing a written consent under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) alone makes an opt-in a party-plaintiff | Opt-ins (Houston, McAllister, Lemon): filing the written consent and filing it in court suffices to become party-plaintiffs | Country Club: opt-ins did not become parties because the district court never adjudicated they were "similarly situated" to the named plaintiff | Filing a written consent confers party-plaintiff status; conditional certification is not required to join as a party-plaintiff |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying conditional certification as untimely | Mickles/Appellants: court implicitly gave prior permission during a telephone conference to file the motion later | Country Club: motion was filed nearly eight months after the local-rule deadline without prior court permission | No abuse of discretion; denial affirmed—phone conference did not constitute prior permission |
| Whether the clarification order effectively dismissed opt-ins with prejudice and was proper | Appellants: deeming them non-parties functioned as a dismissal with prejudice (likely time-bar to refile) and was erroneous | Country Club: opt-ins never became parties, so clarification correctly identified status | Clarification order vacated; court erred to deem them non-parties; remand to dismiss without prejudice or proceed on individual claims |
| Whether opt-ins are entitled to statutory tolling from their consent filing dates | Appellants: tolling applies from each consent filing under 29 U.S.C. § 256(b) | Country Club: contested effect of consent filing if opt-in status was unclear | Court awarded statutory tolling beginning on each opt-in’s consent filing date |
Key Cases Cited
- Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir.) (describing two-tiered "conditional certification" notice/decertification approach)
- Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66 (2013) (conditional certification only authorizes notice; opt-ins become parties by filing written consents)
- Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir.) (conditional certification facilitates notice; opt-ins must affirmatively file written consents)
- Prickett v. DeKalb County, 349 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir.) (opt-in plaintiffs have same status as named plaintiffs once party-plaintiffs)
- Zocoras v. Castro, 465 F.3d 479 (11th Cir.) (dismissal with prejudice requires clear record of delay/willfulness and lesser sanctions inadequate)
- Fox v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 519 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir.) (decertification typically results in dismissal of opt-ins without prejudice)