Laura Constantino v. Dallas County Hospital District D/B/A Parkland Health & Hospital System A/K/A Parkland Memorial Hospital, 05-15-01273-CV

Laura Constantino was injured when a wall-mounted television and bracket fell and struck her while visiting a patient at Parkland Hospital.
She sued Dallas County Hospital District (Parkland), alleging negligence and asserting waiver of governmental immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) §101.021(2) (condition or use of tangible personal property) and, alternatively, §101.022 (premises defect).
Trial court dismissed her premises-defect claim but denied Parkland’s plea as to the §101.021(2) claim; Parkland appealed. The appellate court remanded to allow Constantino to amend to attempt to plead a proper §101.021(2) claim.
On remand Constantino amended to allege only a condition of tangible personal property: the TV/bracket allegedly lacked certain safety components (set screw, lock washer, lock nut, longer bolt, safety cable), causing the nut to back off and the TV to fall.
Evidence showed the mount system (bolt and standard nut) had held the TV on the wall for 15–20 years, and the wall mount remained attached to the wall after the fall; the court analyzed whether the claim was truly a defect in the tangible personal property or merely a premises defect (dangerous condition of real property).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did Parkland meet its burden to show the trial court lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction?	Constantino: Parkland failed to show immunity barred the suit.	Parkland: As a governmental unit, it is immune absent a TTCA waiver; plaintiff must show waiver.	Held: Parkland met its burden; Constantino failed to establish a fact issue on waiver.
Did the amended pleading/evidence state a claim under TTCA §101.021(2) (condition of tangible personal property) rather than a premises defect?	Constantino: The TV/bracket and missing safety components were defective as tangible personal property (integral‑safety‑component doctrine); immunity waived under §101.021(2).	Parkland: The alleged defect created a dangerous condition of the premises (placement and attachment), so the claim is a premises defect governed by §101.022 (heightened standards), not §101.021(2).	Held: The claim is a premises defect (personal property created the dangerous condition); the alleged missing components were not entirely lacking but merely inadequate; §101.021(2) waiver does not apply.

Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88 (Tex. 2012) (governmental immunity limits subject‑matter jurisdiction unless waived)
Texas Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (plea to jurisdiction review; TTCA waiver principles)
Dallas County v. Posey, 290 S.W.3d 869 (Tex. 2009) (definition of "condition" and distinctions for TTCA claims)
Salcedo v. El Paso Hosp. Dist., 659 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. 1983) (condition of tangible property analysis)
City of N. Richland Hills v. Friend, 370 S.W.3d 369 (Tex. 2012) (limitations on "use" waiver; adequacy vs. nonexistence of safety features)
Texas A & M Univ. v. Bishop, 156 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2005) (integral‑safety‑component doctrine and scope of "use")
Robinson v. Central Tex. MHMR Ctr., 780 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1989) (early integral‑safety‑component precedent)
Lowe v. Texas Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1976) (integral safety‑component cases supporting waiver in specific contexts)