Laura Beeman and Janet Lock v. Brad Livingston, in His Official Capacity as Executive Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
468 S.W.3d 534
| Tex. | 2015Background
- Deaf inmates Laura Beeman and Janet Lock sued Brad Livingston in his official capacity as TDCJ Executive Director, alleging violations of Texas Human Resources Code Chapter 121 by failing to provide reasonable accommodations (TTY, videophone, qualified interpreters) at the Lane Murray Unit.
- Trial court found Chapter 121 applied to prisons, held Livingston discriminated, and ordered a variety of accommodations (interpreters at hearings, classes, grievance proceedings, TTY/videophone access, etc.).
- The court of appeals reversed and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, holding prisons are not “public facilities” under Chapter 121 and therefore the ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity did not apply.
- Beeman argued Chapter 121’s definition of “public facility” should include prisons (public use or subsets of the public and visitors/volunteers), and that Livingston acted ultra vires by failing to comply.
- Livingston argued (1) “public” in the statute means open and accessible to the public so prisons are excluded; (2) inmates are not the public; and (3) even if Chapter 121 applied, his actions were discretionary, not ultra vires.
- The Texas Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals: Chapter 121’s “public” means open and accessible to the public; prisons are not within the definition; therefore Beeman failed to state an ultra vires claim and the suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Chapter 121’s definition of “public facility” includes state prisons | Chapter 121’s term “public building” means buildings used for public purposes (government-owned) or includes prison facilities because inmates are part of the public and visitors access prisons | “Public” means open and accessible to the general public; prisons are closed, segregated facilities and thus excluded | The Court held “public” in the statute denotes openness/accessibility; prisons are not “public facilities” under Chapter 121 |
| Whether Livingston’s failure to provide accommodations was an ultra vires act (permitting suit despite sovereign immunity) | Livingston violated a ministerial statutory duty under Chapter 121 by not providing mandated accommodations, so his acts were ultra vires | Because Chapter 121 does not apply to prisons, Livingston could not have acted ultra vires; alternatively, any accommodations left discretion to TDCJ | Held Beeman failed to show an ultra vires violation because the statute does not apply to prisons, so sovereign immunity bars suit |
| Whether interpretation should follow ADA or legislative purpose to include prisons | The ADA covers state prisons and legislative purpose favors access for persons with disabilities, so Chapter 121 should be read to include prisons | Chapter 121’s text differs from the ADA; later minor amendments didn’t change the core definition; federal ADA interpretation is not controlling | Held federal ADA and committee statements do not change Chapter 121’s text; reliance on ADA is unpersuasive for expanding the statute |
| Whether limited public access (volunteers/visitors) or inclusion of dormitories implies prisons are covered | Limited public entry or inclusion of dormitories shows the list wasn’t limited to fully open places; prisons share similar attributes and should be included | Many government buildings allow limited access to subsets of the public; reading “public building” to include all government buildings would render the term meaningless | Held limited access does not convert prisons into “public” facilities for the statute; including such buildings would effectively make the term meaningless |
Key Cases Cited
- Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2002) (state must consent to suit or sovereign immunity bars claim)
- City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) (ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity requires official acted without legal authority or failed to perform a ministerial act)
- City of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128 (Tex. 2011) (Legislative waiver of immunity required to sue the State)
- Tex. Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628 (Tex. 2010) (statutory construction begins with plain text and context)
- State v. $1,760.00 in U.S. Currency, 406 S.W.3d 177 (Tex. 2013) (use dictionary definitions when term is undefined but prefer the meaning consistent with statutory context)
- Carlisle v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 152 S.W.2d 1073 (Tex. 1941) (distinction between premises implicitly open to the public and privately maintained premises with special invitation)
- Pa. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yesky, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) (under ADA, state prisons fall within “public entity” definition)