996 F.3d 269
5th Cir.2021Background
- Plaintiff Deborah Laufer, a Florida resident and frequent ADA "tester," sued Mann Hospitality (owner of the Sunset Inn in Caldwell, TX) under Title III of the ADA alleging the inn’s information on third‑party online reservation systems (ORS) failed to identify accessible rooms.
- Laufer visited the ORS to review accessibility information but did not attempt to book a room, has no definite plans to travel to Caldwell, and alleges only a general intent to travel in Texas after the COVID pandemic.
- The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction (no injury in fact) and awarded Mann “just costs” plus attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1919.
- Laufer appealed both the dismissal and the attorneys’‑fees award.
- The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing but vacated the attorneys’‑fees award because § 1919 authorizes only costs, not attorneys’ fees, and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing (injury‑in‑fact) | Laufer says her inability to determine accessible rooms from the ORS is an "informational injury" that gives Article III standing; tester status suffices. | Mann says Laufer lacks a concrete, particularized injury: she never tried to book, has no concrete plans to visit Caldwell, and is only a tester. | No standing: informational allegation alone insufficient; no concrete, imminent injury; tester status does not relieve Article III requirements. |
| Attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1919 | Laufer argued fee award improper because § 1919 does not authorize attorneys’ fees. | Mann (and the district court) treated fees as appropriate in this dismissal context. | Vacated fees: § 1919 permits "just costs" but not attorneys’ fees; remanded for further proceedings (district court may consider other bases for fees if supported). |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (Article III requires a concrete and particularized injury even for statutory violations)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires injury in fact, traceability, and redressability)
- Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (tester can be the object of a misrepresentation actionable under statute)
- Lee v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 837 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2016) (statutory rights must be tied to a concrete interest for injury in fact)
- Brintley v. Aeroquip Credit Union, 936 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2019) (informational injuries require the information to have some relevance to the plaintiff)
- Griffin v. Dep’t of Lab. Fed. Credit Union, 912 F.3d 649 (4th Cir. 2019) (inability to obtain information is concrete only when relevant to the litigant)
- Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (courts may award attorney’s fees under inherent powers for bad‑faith or egregious conduct)
- Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973) (equitable power to award fees in certain circumstances)
- Wilkinson v. D.M. Weatherly Co., 655 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1981) (28 U.S.C. § 1919 authorizes just costs but not attorneys’ fees)