Laufer v. Looper, 22 F.4th 871

Deborah Laufer, a wheelchair user and self-described ADA "tester," visited the Elk Run Inn’s online reservation system (ORS) to assess compliance with 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(1)(ii) but had no intent to stay at the hotel.
Laufer alleged the ORS failed to identify accessible rooms, did not allow booking of accessible rooms, and provided insufficient accessibility information, violating Title III of the ADA.
She sued owners Randall and Cynthia Looper in federal court seeking relief under Title III and Colorado law; the Loopers moved to dismiss for lack of Article III standing (and alternatively for failure to state a claim).
Laufer submitted a declaration saying she visits a niece in Colorado about once a year and intends to travel in the state when safe, but conceded no concrete plans to book or stay at the Elk Run Inn.
The district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing, finding Laufer had not alleged a concrete and particularized injury; the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Laufer has Article III standing from encountering a noncompliant ORS	Laufer: visiting the ORS and being denied statutorily required accessibility information is a concrete, particularized injury; intent to stay is not required	Loopers: Laufer has no concrete or imminent injury—no intent to book or visit—so a statutory violation alone is insufficient	No standing; statutory violation without concrete, particularized injury fails Article III
Whether an "informational injury" (Public Citizen / Akins) supports standing here	Laufer: denial of information she is legally entitled to is an informational injury like in Public Citizen and Akins	Loopers: those cases involved plaintiffs who intended to use the information; Laufer identifies no downstream use or adverse effect from missing information	Informational-injury cases are distinguishable; without relevance or downstream consequences, no injury in fact
Whether tester status or precedent (Havens, Tandy, Colo. Cross) automatically confers standing	Laufer: as an ADA tester she may sue for regulatory informational violations even without intent to use the PPA	Loopers: tester status does not eliminate Article III; testers must still show a concrete, imminent threat or actual misuse	Tester status alone insufficient; prior tester wins involved misrepresentation or asserted plans to return/use, which Laufer did not allege

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (U.S. 2016) (Article III requires a concrete injury even for statutory violations)
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (U.S. 2021) (statutory cause of action does not substitute for a concrete Article III harm; informational harms must have adverse effects)
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (U.S. 1982) (FHA tester who received racially motivated misrepresentations suffered a concrete informational injury)
Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (U.S. 1989) (denial of statutorily required records can be a distinct injury supporting standing)
FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (U.S. 1998) (denial of information required by statute can be a concrete injury when plaintiffs show informational use/relevance)
Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004) (ADA testers can have standing but must show concrete intent or imminent threat to use the service)
Colo. Cross Disability Coal. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 765 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2014) (Title III tester standing requires a present plan to return or otherwise a concrete, imminent injury)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (elements of Article III standing and definition of injury in fact)