Lashawnda Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., et
969 F.3d 571
| 5th Cir. | 2020Background
- Lashawnda Brown, an assistant manager at a Biloxi Wal‑Mart, reported store manager Aurelio Quinn via Wal‑Mart’s ethics hotline in March–April 2017 alleging Quinn solicited sex from employees.
- Quinn learned Brown had reported him; Brown perceived retaliatory animus.
- On May 9, 2017 a disputed shoplifting incident occurred: Brown engaged a customer despite knowing a prior employee had made a “bad stop”; Quinn later also engaged the customer and looked inside her purse.
- Asset protection manager Terry Hebert investigated, reviewed witness statements and surveillance, concluded Brown violated Wal‑Mart’s AP‑09 shoplifter policy and recommended termination because Brown already had three prior coachings.
- Brown was terminated May 19, 2017; she sued for Title VII retaliation (and other state claims), district court granted summary judgment for Wal‑Mart, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Title VII retaliation claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prima facie causation by timing | Brown: reports (Mar–Apr) and termination (May) — 6–7 weeks — suffice to show causation by proximity | Wal‑Mart: timing alone insufficient to prove causation | Court: Timing was close enough to satisfy prima facie causation requirement |
| Pretext / but‑for causation (cat’s paw) | Brown: Quinn poisoned the investigation (pre‑investigation talks), pressured witness Rankin, and thus caused termination | Wal‑Mart: Hebert conducted an independent investigation, viewed video, Rankin refused to lie, and Hebert’s stated basis (AP‑09 violation + prior coachings) was independent | Court: Evidence insufficient to show Quinn’s actions were the but‑for cause; no genuine dispute of material fact on pretext; summary judgment proper |
| Comparator / disparate treatment | Brown: Quinn engaged more intrusively (looked in purse, longer contact) yet was not disciplined, showing disparate treatment | Wal‑Mart: Brown admitted she knew of the bad stop before engaging; Quinn acted after customer asked for manager — not similarly situated | Court: Differences were material; comparator not similarly situated enough to prove pretext |
| Employer’s stated reason v. policy interpretation | Brown: AP‑09 was misapplied and termination unnecessary under policy | Wal‑Mart: Relevant inquiry is whether Hebert’s (accurate or not) perception motivated termination, not correctness of policy application | Court: Even if policy interpretation debatable, Brown failed to show Hebert relied on retaliatory motive rather than his independent perception |
Key Cases Cited
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (U.S. 2006) (defines Title VII antiretaliation protection)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (establishes burden‑shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (U.S. 2013) (retaliation claims require but‑for causation)
- Garcia v. Prof’l Cont. Servs., Inc., 938 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2019) (prima facie timing standard for causation)
- Musser v. Paul Quinn Coll., 944 F.3d 557 (5th Cir. 2019) (explains quantum of evidence needed to survive summary judgment on causation)
- Zamora v. City of Houston, 798 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2015) (cat’s paw liability: supervisor’s biased acts can establish but‑for causation)