Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs CA4/3
230 Cal. App. 4th 336
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- Plaintiff Wayne Larson underwent kidney stone surgery at UHS; Dr. Richard Shuman was the anesthesiologist. Larson alleged during preoperative care and anesthesia administration Shuman grabbed/twisted his arm, pried open his mouth, and pressed/lifted/pushed his face and head, leaving bruising and swelling.
- Larson originally filed an earlier action alleging medical negligence, battery, assault, and IIED; demurrers were sustained with leave to amend because the prior complaint failed to plead lack of consent; Larson dismissed that action and filed a new complaint alleging battery and IIED only.
- Defendants demurred in the new action, contending MICRA Code Civ. Proc. § 340.5’s one‑year statute of limitations for claims "based on professional negligence" barred the suit; the trial court judicially noticed the earlier pleadings and sustained the demurrers without leave to amend.
- On appeal the core question was whether Larson’s intentional tort claims were truly independent intentional misconduct (governed by the two‑year general personal injury statute) or, in substance, challenges to the manner of providing professional health care and thus subject to § 340.5’s one‑year limit.
- The Court of Appeal looked past labels, considered prior pleadings under the sham‑pleading doctrine, held Larson’s allegations related to how Shuman performed professional services (preop check and anesthesia), and affirmed dismissal as time‑barred under § 340.5.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 340.5’s one‑year limitations period applies to Larson’s battery and IIED claims | Larson: claims are intentional torts, so the general two‑year personal injury statute (§ 335.1) applies | Defendants: claims attack how a health‑care service was performed and thus are "based on professional negligence" under § 340.5 | Held: § 340.5 applies — claims are based on professional negligence and are time‑barred |
| Whether the trial court could consider allegations from Larson’s earlier dismissed complaint | Larson: the operative complaint supersedes earlier pleadings; court should not consider them | Defendants: earlier pleadings may be judicially noticed to prevent sham pleading/omission of harmful facts | Held: court properly considered earlier pleadings under the sham‑pleading doctrine; omissions bound Larson |
| Whether MICRA (and related precedent) should be interpreted broadly to include any conduct "directly related" to professional services | Larson: intentional tort labels should preclude MICRA limits | Defendants: MICRA applies to claims that challenge how professional services were rendered | Held: court must look to the gravamen; here the conduct challenged the manner of professional care, so MICRA applies |
| Whether leave to amend was required | Larson: (did not propose amendments) | Defendants: statute of limitations bar cannot be cured by amendment here | Held: denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion; appellant did not show how amendment could avoid § 340.5 bar |
Key Cases Cited
- Rosen v. St. Joseph Hosp. of Orange Cty., 193 Cal.App.4th 453 (summary of demurrer review and pleading principles)
- Unruh‑Haxton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 162 Cal.App.4th 343 (intentional, egregious misconduct not based on professional negligence)
- Smith v. Ben Bennett, Inc., 133 Cal.App.4th 1507 (MICRA scope and analysis)
- Central Pathology Services Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.4th 181 (distinguishing statute interpretations; not controlling for MICRA provisions)
- Perry v. Shaw, 88 Cal.App.4th 658 (true battery vs. technical/negligent battery distinction)
- Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reiswig, 21 Cal.4th 208 (indemnity claims may be based on professional negligence when they flow from malpractice)
- Barris v. County of Los Angeles, 20 Cal.4th 101 (federal EMTALA claim held to be based on professional negligence under MICRA analysis)
- Delaney v. Baker, 20 Cal.4th 23 (refusal to extend Central Pathology’s test to MICRA)
- So v. Shin, 212 Cal.App.4th 652 (distinguishing negligence that furthers non‑medical purposes from professional negligence)