Larson v. State
488 S.W.3d 413
| Tex. App. | 2016Background
- Louanne Larson was convicted of capital murder in 1993; jury assessed life and conviction affirmed on direct appeal.
- Larson filed a 2002 Article 64.03 motion for post-conviction DNA testing (denied and affirmed). She filed a second Article 64.03 motion in Feb. 2015 seeking DNA testing of: a pair of blood‑spattered blue jeans (Item (1)), sheetrock from the crime scene, a trunk‑lid blood sample, and blood samples of the victims.
- Trial court denied the 2015 motion, finding identity was not at issue for some items, that certain items lacked an adequate chain of custody or had been destroyed/contaminated, and that testing would not establish by a preponderance that Larson would not have been convicted.
- Larson argued testing—particularly of the inside of the jeans—could show another person (e.g., Tim Rule) wore the jeans and thus exculpate her; she also sought preservation/chain‑of‑custody accounting by the State.
- The court applied the Article 64.03 standard in effect when Larson filed (pre‑Sept. 2015): the movant must prove evidence still exists and contains biological material and must prove by a preponderance that exculpatory results would have prevented conviction.
- Court affirmed denial: jeans could not be shown to contain biological material under the statute in effect when the motion was filed; sheetrock/trunk/blood samples unavailable, destroyed, or contaminated per trial‑court findings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Larson) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Larson is entitled to DNA testing of the blue jeans | Testing inside the jeans could reveal another person’s DNA (e.g., Rule), undermining State's circumstantial link to Larson | Jeans must be shown to contain biological material to obtain testing under the statute in effect when motion filed | Denied — Larson failed to prove the jeans contain biological material as required by the pre‑Sept.2015 statute |
| Proper statutory standard for post‑conviction testing | Larson urges testing under amended, more permissive standards (filed before effective date) | State relies on statute in effect at filing; movant must show biological material exists and preponderance that exculpatory results would prevent conviction | Applied the statute in effect at filing; Larson’s motion governed by pre‑Sept.2015 requirements and so fails as to the jeans |
| Chain of custody and condition of sheetrock, trunk lid, and victim blood samples | Larson seeks testing of sheetrock and trunk blood and comparison using victims’ blood to establish mismatch/exculpation | State/trial court: items contaminated, destroyed, not preserved, or lack sufficient chain of custody for testing | Denied — trial court findings (handled repeatedly, water damage, destroyed/unavailable samples) were deferred to; testing not permitted |
| Preclusive effect of prior appellate decision (law of the case) | Larson attempts re‑litigation of DNA claims after statutory changes and prior denial | State invokes law of the case: prior appellate ruling that the jeans existed, chain was sufficient, and testing would not meet burden controls | Court applies law of the case to aspects previously resolved; prior findings binding and bar relitigation here |
Key Cases Cited
- Kutzner v. State, 75 S.W.3d 427 (Tex. Crim. App.) (established prior “reasonable probability” standard later altered by statute)
- Smith v. State, 165 S.W.3d 361 (Tex. Crim. App.) (explaining legislative amendment changing burden to preponderance)
- Swearingen v. State, 424 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. Crim. App.) (holding defendant must prove evidence contains biological material under prior statutory language)
- Ex parte Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d 883 (Tex. Crim. App.) (describing when DNA results would ‘‘affirmatively cast doubt’’ on conviction)
- Routier v. State, 273 S.W.3d 241 (Tex. Crim. App.) (standard of appellate deference to trial court fact findings)
- Rule v. State, 890 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. App. Texarkana) (reciting underlying facts and importance of jeans to circumstantial case)
