Larson v. City of Minneapolis, 568 F.Supp.3d 997

Background

On May 29–30, 2020 Governor Tim Walz and Minneapolis Mayor Jacob Frey issued overlapping emergency nighttime curfews in response to widespread civil unrest after George Floyd’s murder.
Plaintiff Autumn Larson attended a peaceful protest on May 30, stayed past 8:00 p.m., and later attempted to drive home near East Lake Street and Hiawatha Avenue during the curfew period.
Police deployed crowd-control munitions; Larson alleges an unidentified officer fired a projectile that struck her in the face, causing serious injury.
Larson sued the City and Doe officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force, due process, First Amendment facial challenge to the Mayor’s curfew, and Fourteenth Amendment travel/public-presence claims) and asserted state tort claims; she sought only damages and fees, not injunctive relief.
The City moved to dismiss Larson’s § 1983 claims that challenge the Mayor’s curfew (First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment movement/public-presence claims).
The court dismissed those curfew-based claims without prejudice for lack of Article III standing (redressability) because Larson did not challenge the materially identical Governor’s curfew; the court alternatively held the Mayor’s curfew would survive ordinary First/Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny as narrowly tailored with adequate alternative channels.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing / redressability of curfew challenge	Larson contests facial unconstitutionality of Mayor Frey’s curfew and seeks damages for its enforcement.	City argues the Mayor’s curfew is moot or, alternatively, Larson lacks standing because Governor Walz’s overlapping curfew was unchallenged and would independently bar relief.	Dismissed for lack of Article III standing/redressability: unchallenged Governor curfew would prevent relief even if Mayor’s order were invalid.
First Amendment facial challenge to Mayor’s curfew	Curfew was overbroad and not narrowly tailored; it burdened speech and left few alternatives.	Curfew was content-neutral, imposed to address urgent public-safety interests arising from widespread fires, looting, and violence; it was properly tailored and left daytime/other channels open.	On the merits (alternative): curfew upheld as content-neutral, narrowly tailored to significant safety interest and leaving ample alternative channels.
Fourteenth Amendment right-to-travel / public-presence challenge	Curfew unlawfully criminalized public presence and movement across much of the city.	Same as First Amendment defense—curfew was proportionate to public-safety emergency and analogous intermediate scrutiny supports it.	On the merits (alternative): travel/public-presence claim fails for same reasons as First Amendment claim; curfew proportional to public-safety need.
Relation of excessive-force claims to curfew-based claims	Larson alleges curfew enforcement caused the injury from police projectiles.	City notes excessive-force issues are governed by the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard and are not plausibly tied to the Mayor’s curfew; curfew challenge is separate.	The court found Larson’s complaint did not plausibly connect the use of force to curfew enforcement; excessive-force claims stand or fall under Fourth Amendment analysis distinct from curfew claims.

Key Cases Cited

Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under § 1983 requires a policy or custom)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (excessive-force claims arise under Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires injury, traceability, and redressability)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading must permit plausible inference of liability)
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (time, place, manner test for content-neutral restrictions)
McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014) (narrow tailoring requires not substantially more speech restriction than necessary)
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (high bar for successful facial challenges)
United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1971) (deferential test for executive curfew decisions: good faith and factual basis)
Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005) (applied ordinary First Amendment framework to curfew-like emergency restrictions)
Phelps-Roper v. Ricketts, 867 F.3d 883 (8th Cir. 2017) (explaining difficulty of successful facial challenges)
Advantage Media, L.L.C. v. City of Eden Prairie, 456 F.3d 793 (8th Cir. 2006) (overbreadth/redressability limits on § 1983 damages recovery)
Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005) (discussing uncertainty in Eighth Circuit about fundamental right to intrastate travel)