Larry Walker v. State of Mississippi, 196 So. 3d 978

Background

In April 2001 Walker forced a minor at gunpoint into her car, drove to a secluded field, attempted rape, and ultimately compelled the victim to perform oral sex before releasing her.
A Lawrence County grand jury indicted Walker in February 2002 on multiple counts including carjacking, kidnapping, robbery, sexual battery, and attempted forcible sexual intercourse.
Walker’s first trial (Jan 2004) in Marion County produced acquittals on some counts and a mistrial on others; second trial (June 2004) resulted in convictions later reversed on appeal (Walker I), leading to a remand for retrial.
Third trial (April 2010) resulted in convictions for carjacking and kidnapping; Walker was sentenced as a habitual offender to concurrent life sentences without parole.
On appeal Walker argued (1) the attempted-forcible-sexual-intercourse indictment was defective and prejudicial; (2) the State failed to prove habitual-offender status beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) statutory and constitutional speedy-trial rights were violated. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Defective indictment for attempted forcible sexual intercourse	Indictment omitted a specific overt act required by the attempt statute, rendering it insufficient and permitting prejudicial evidence	Indictment contained language referencing an overt act and the attempt statute; trial evidence on carjacking and kidnapping was sufficient	Court: Indictment adequate (unlike Short); even if defective as to specificity, Walker cannot show actual prejudice to the guilty verdicts; issue meritless
Proof of habitual-offender status at sentencing	Pen-pack records lacked a sworn affidavit and court made no explicit finding; thus proof was insufficient	State introduced certified pen-packs with Walker’s identifying information; counsel failed to object at sentencing	Court: Issue procedurally barred for failing to object; in any event certified pen-packs suffice to prove prior convictions; sentencing affirmed
Statutory speedy-trial (270-day rule) before first trial	Time from arraignment/waiver to trial exceeded 270 days	Many days were attributable to Walker (continuances, change of venue) or excused (crime-lab delays); subtracting these days keeps the State within the 270-day limit	Court: After attributing delays properly and excluding crime-lab backlog days, statutory period was not violated
Constitutional speedy-trial (Barker factors) between retrial mandate and third trial	Nearly 3.5 years elapsed after mandate—presumptively prejudicial—so constitutional right violated	Delays had multiple causes: defense counsel changes/withdrawals, court scheduling, some delays attributable to Walker; Walker did not timely and consistently assert the right; actual prejudice not shown	Court: Though length was long (favors Walker), reason for delay, lack of timely assertion, and absence of actual prejudice predominantly favor the State; no constitutional violation

Key Cases Cited

Short v. State, 990 So. 2d 818 (Miss. Ct. App.) (indictment for attempt must state overt act)
Durr v. State, 446 So. 2d 1016 (Miss.) (attempt statute requires setting forth an overt act)
Frazier v. State, 907 So. 2d 985 (Miss. Ct. App.) (certified pen-packs suffice as proof of prior convictions)
Sharp v. State, 786 So. 2d 372 (Miss.) (method for computing statutory 270-day speedy-trial period)
Handley v. State, 574 So. 2d 671 (Miss.) (statutory 270-day rule satisfied once initial trial occurs; retrial timing discretionary)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S.) (four-factor test for constitutional speedy-trial claims)
Jenkins v. State, 947 So. 2d 270 (Miss.) (crime-lab backlog can constitute good cause excusing delay)
DeLoach v. State, 722 So. 2d 512 (Miss. Ct. App.) (allocating delay and standard of review for speedy-trial findings)