Larry Sneed v. The City of Red Bank, Tennessee, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 962

Larry Sneed, former Red Bank police chief, sued the City alleging TPPA retaliatory discharge and age discrimination under the THRA; suit was filed in chancery court.
Defendants moved to transfer and to have trial conducted without a jury under the GTLA; chancery court granted transfer and denied jury on TPPA but initially allowed jury on THRA.
The trial court permitted an interlocutory appeal; the Court of Appeals, relying on Young v. Davis, held the GTLA applies to THRA suits against municipalities and required trial in circuit court without a jury.
Tennessee Supreme Court granted review to decide whether GTLA governs THRA claims and, if not, whether a plaintiff who files a THRA claim in chancery court has a statutory right to a jury.
The Supreme Court held the THRA is an independent statute that removes governmental immunity and controls THRA claims; the GTLA does not govern THRA claims.
The Court also held that a plaintiff who files a THRA claim in chancery court is entitled to a jury under Tenn. Code Ann. § 21-1-103 (statutory right to jury in chancery), so Sneed’s THRA claim must be remanded to chancery for further proceedings with jury access preserved.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the GTLA governs THRA claims against governmental entities	Sneed: THRA is an independent statute that removes immunity and therefore is not governed by GTLA	Red Bank: GTLA governs statutory claims against municipalities (per Young), so THRA claims must follow GTLA procedures	Held: GTLA does not govern THRA claims; THRA is an independent remedial statute that removes immunity and controls adjudication
Whether a THRA plaintiff who files in chancery court has a right to jury trial	Sneed: Filing in chancery invokes § 21-1-103, which grants parties a jury for material factual disputes	Red Bank: GTLA’s prohibition on jury (if GTLA applied) would preclude jury; otherwise silent on jury under THRA	Held: Plaintiff has statutory right to jury in chancery under § 21-1-103; GTLA jury prohibition does not apply to THRA claims

Cruse v. City of Columbia, 922 S.W.2d 492 (Tenn. 1996) (independent statutory remedies that remove immunity are not governed by GTLA procedural requirements)
Lucius v. City of Memphis, 925 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1996) (GTLA governs local-government immunity distinct from State)
Fretwell v. Chaffin, 652 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. 1983) (discussing governmental vs. proprietary function distinction and GTLA’s abrogation of that divide)
Crowe v. John W. Harton Mem’l Hosp., 579 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. 1979) (historical treatment of local government immunity and courts’ limitations)
Jenkins v. Loudon County, 736 S.W.2d 603 (Tenn. 1987) (GTLA does not necessarily displace independent statutory remedies)
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (U.S. 1978) (ADEA construed to afford jury trial rights, contemporaneous to THRA enactment)