Larry Myers v. Crouse-Hinds: GE v. Mary R. Geyman: Owens-Illinois, Inc v. Mary R. Geyman
53 N.E.3d 1160
Ind.2016Background
- Three appeals challenge the Indiana Product Liability Act statute of repose and whether Ott should be reconsidered.
- Plaintiffs Myers and Geyman allege asbestos-related diseases from long-latency exposure; Myers diagnosed 2014, Geyman diagnosed 2007 and died 2008.
- Myers listed 40 defendants; Geyman listed 20; several moved for summary judgment; appeals arise from denial or entry of summary judgment.
- Ott held Section 2 (asbestos-related actions) applies only to those who mined and sold raw asbestos; others fall under Section 1.
- Majority refuses to overrule Ott, but finds Section 2 violates Article 1, Section 23; Section 2 is void, all claims then fall under Section 1.
- Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc. is restored as controlling precedent; statute of repose does not bar protracted exposure to an inherently dangerous foreign substance.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Should Ott be overruled on statutory construction? | Geyman/Myers urge new class-based analysis under Article 1, §23. | Defendants urge stare decisis and legislative acquiescence, Ott should stand. | Ott not overruled; Ott's statutory construction remains. |
| Does Section 2 violate Equal Privileges and Immunities under Article 1, §23? | Section 2 imposes disparate treatment among asbestos victims. | Section 2 rationally related to distinguishing classes of asbestos-related actions. | Section 2 invalid under Article 1, §23; the two classes are not reasonably related to inherent differences and are not uniformly applicable. |
| Does Covalt control restore the statute of repose for protracted asbestos exposure? | Covalt demonstrates repose does not apply to protracted exposure to inherently dangerous substances. | Ott governs; Covalt is superseded by Section 2. | Covalt restored; repose does not apply to asbestos injury cases with protracted exposure. |
| What is the outcome for the specific summary judgment motions in the GE, Owens-Illinois, and Crouse-Hinds cases? | Repose should bar some defendants; liability timeline recognized. | Repose arguments under Ott/Section 1 control; argue for dismissal. | Denied summary judgment in GE and Owens-Illinois; reversed summary judgment in Crouse-Hinds; remanded. |
Key Cases Cited
- Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc., 543 N.E.2d 382 (Ind. 1989) (recovery permitting suit within two years after disease discovery for protracted exposure)
- Ott, Allied-Signal v. Ott, 785 N.E.2d 1068 (Ind. 2003) (distinction between asbestos-related actions and others under Section 2)
- Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1994) (equal privileges and immunities two-prong test for disparate treatment)
- McIntosh v. Melroe Co., Div. of Clark Equip. Co., 729 N.E.2d 972 (Ind. 2000) (statute of repose as a permissible legislative decision to limit liability)
- Fraley v. Minger, 829 N.E.2d 476 (Ind. 2005) (precedent on stare decisis and legislative acquiescence)