Larry Hooper v. Proctor Health Care Incorporat, 804 F.3d 846

Hooper, a family physician with a bipolar disorder diagnosis, disclosed his condition to Proctor HR in April 2010 and was placed on paid medical leave.
Hooper’s treating psychiatrist cleared him to return to work in mid-May; Proctor required an independent exam and Dr. Cavanaugh conducted one in August 2010.
Dr. Cavanaugh orally advised on August 4 that Hooper could return to work without restrictions but suggested optional workplace modifications to reduce stress.
Proctor repeatedly contacted Hooper beginning August 4–5 asking him to return; Hooper did not report and Proctor sent a letter (Aug. 16) warning termination if he did not contact them by Aug. 20.
Proctor terminated Hooper effective Aug. 20 after no response; Hooper later filed administrative charges and sued under the ADA alleging disability discrimination (and argued failure to accommodate at summary judgment).
The district court granted summary judgment for Proctor; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the failure-to-accommodate theory not pled and meritless, and no evidence of discrimination or pretext.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Hooper sufficiently pleaded a failure-to-accommodate claim	Hooper contends alleging he was a "qualified individual" placed Proctor on notice of an accommodation claim	Proctor argues complaint contained no facts about requested accommodations or Dr. Cavanaugh’s recommendations	Not pled. Even if preserved, fails on merits because Dr. Cavanaugh cleared Hooper to work without restrictions, so no accommodation was required
Whether evidence supports ADA disability discrimination (direct or indirect methods)	Hooper argues Proctor sought a pretextual reason to fire him after learning of his bipolar disorder; points to HR remarks and increased personnel file	Proctor contends it legitimately terminated Hooper for failing to return after being told he was cleared and repeatedly contacted; absenteeism justified termination	No genuine issue of material fact. No comparator evidence for indirect method; no proof of causation or pretext under direct method; stray remark and file size are speculative and insufficient

Malin v. Hospira, Inc., 762 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 2014) (summary judgment facts viewed in favor of nonmovant)
Reeves ex rel. Reeves v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 759 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2014) (pleading must give defendant fair notice; failure-to-accommodate discussion)
Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619 (7th Cir. 2013) (employer’s accommodation duty triggered only when limitations affect essential job functions)
Bunn v. Khoury Enters., Inc., 753 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2014) (direct vs. indirect methods for ADA proof)
Lindemann v. Mobil Oil Corp., 141 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 1998) (absenteeism is legitimate reason for termination)
Fleishman v. Continental Casualty Co., 698 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2012) (isolated, noncontemporaneous remarks are insufficient to prove discrimination)