925 F.3d 950
7th Cir.2019Background
- Larry Hatfield convicted under 18 U.S.C. §1001(a) for making false statements to obtain Railroad Retirement benefits (nonviolent fraud); received three years’ probation (no prison).
- Federal statute 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by anyone convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment over one year.
- District court held §922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to Hatfield because his nonviolent felony does not indicate dangerousness.
- Government appealed; Seventh Circuit panel relied on its recent decision in Kanter v. Barr to evaluate the as-applied challenge.
- Court considered whether a nonviolent felon who did not serve prison time can challenge felon-dispossession statute and whether data can identify felons unlikely to be dangerous.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §922(g)(1) as applied to a nonviolent fraud felon violates the Second Amendment | Hatfield: his nonviolent fraud conviction does not make him dangerous; ban is unconstitutional as applied | Govt: felon-dispossession statutes valid; felons (including fraud convicts) fall outside protected class or, alternatively, government meets intermediate scrutiny | Reversed district court; Kanter controls—§922(g)(1) may be applied to fraud felons whose offense carried >1 year maximum, even if no prison served |
| Burden of proof in as-applied challenge to §922(g)(1) | Hatfield: statute invalid because Congress defunded §925(c) relief and he can show harmlessness | Govt: plaintiff bears burden to show he falls within Second Amendment protections or government meets justificatory burden under circuit precedent | Court applied Kanter; majority placed burden on plaintiff to demonstrate ability to predict non-dangerousness and found Hatfield did not meet it |
| Relevance of Heller’s dicta that felon-dispossession laws are “presumptively lawful” | Hatfield: Heller’s assurance supports carving out nonviolent felons like him | Govt: Heller and McDonald uphold felon-dispossession statutes; no requirement to carve out categories absent evidence | Court held Heller/McDonald support application of §922(g)(1); plaintiff must supply evidence to distinguish himself from presumptively disqualified felons |
| Effect of Congress defunding §925(c) relief program on constitutionality of §922(g)(1) | Hatfield: withholding funds for §925(c) makes the statutory ban constitutionally problematic | Govt: funding choice does not invalidate §922(g)(1); applicant still bears burden to show entitlement to relief | Court rejected challenge based on defunding; lack of predictive ability and absence of evidence fatal to Hatfield’s claim |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Second Amendment protects individual right to possess firearms for self-defense; noted felon-dispossession statutes are not cast into doubt)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (applied Heller principles to the states; reiterated validity of longstanding firearm regulations including felon bans)
- Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019) (rejected as-applied Second Amendment challenge by nonviolent fraud felon; applied intermediate scrutiny and upheld §922(g)(1))
- Binderup v. Attorney General, 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (held some nonviolent felons who did not serve prison time might mount as-applied challenges)
- United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71 (2002) (addressed statutory procedures and executive authority related to firearms relief mechanisms)
- United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (applied intermediate scrutiny to §922(g)(9) and considered recidivism data in evaluating firearms prohibition)
- Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011) (explained government must justify firearm regulations not previously recognized by the Supreme Court under intermediate scrutiny)