Larry E. Klayman v. Stephanie DeLuca
712 F. App'x 930
11th Cir.2017Background
- Klayman (an attorney proceeding pro se) sued Baker & Hostetler and three partner-attorneys alleging RICO and related misconduct tied to a 2007 Ohio child-custody proceeding.
- Klayman previously filed related pro se suits in Florida (dismissed with prejudice) and Northern California (dismissed for lack of jurisdiction).
- The Southern District of Florida dismissed the 2015 RICO suit for lack of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction but found Klayman had a history of vexatious litigation.
- The district court enjoined Klayman from filing pro se suits against Baker & Hostetler or its attorneys based on the Ohio custody dispute, but declined to require judicial prescreening; instead it required Klayman to obtain counsel to file future claims.
- Both sides appealed the injunction; this appeal is confined solely to the injunction order (the separate appeal of the dismissal was handled elsewhere).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Klayman’s conduct justified an injunction against future pro se suits about the Ohio custody matter | Klayman denied abusing the court system and argued injunction was improper | Defendants pointed to Klayman’s prior related suits and vexatious litigation history | Court affirmed: history of vexatious litigation warranted an injunction protecting courts and defendants |
| Whether requiring Klayman to obtain counsel before filing preserved his access to courts | Klayman likely argued it infringed access (implicit) | Defendants favored strict limits (including prescreening) to prevent repetitive suits | Court held counsel requirement balanced access and deterrence; not an abuse of discretion |
| Whether the district court should have imposed judicial prescreening of future suits | Klayman opposed prescreening (implicit) | Defendants argued prescreening was required given Rooker-Feldman issues and abuse | Court declined prescreening, finding it would further tax judicial resources and might bar viable suits in other jurisdictions; affirming discretion |
| Whether the All Writs Act/inherent authority supported injunctive relief after dismissal for lack of jurisdiction | Klayman argued injunction inappropriate because case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (implicit) | Defendants argued courts may enjoin vexatious litigants under inherent power/All Writs Act | Court affirmed that inherent power/All Writs Act authorize injunctive relief to protect judicial functions even after dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092 (11th Cir. 2004) (discusses courts’ inherent power and All Writs Act authority to curb vexatious litigation)
- Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (All Writs Act and inherent power permit injunctions against recalcitrant litigants even after dismissal)
- Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1993) (injunctions against vexatious litigants must not completely foreclose access to courts)
- Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2002) (prior vexatious litigation supports enjoining future filings)
- Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 840 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2016) (abuse-of-discretion standard for injunctive relief review)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (U.S. 2005) (statement of Rooker–Feldman doctrine limiting federal review of state-court judgments)
- Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067 (11th Cir. 2006) (upholding requirement that a vexatious litigant obtain counsel as a means to deter frivolous suits)
- Harrelson v. United States, 613 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1980) (courts may enjoin litigants who harass opponents through abusive litigation)