Larkin-Gallagher v. Champlain Valley Physicians Hospital Medical Center
8:18-cv-01173
N.D.N.Y.Dec 2, 2020Background
- Larkin worked as a phlebotomist at CVPH from 2001; she became pregnant in July 2016 and later submitted FMLA paperwork for pregnancy leave.
- In December 2016 a patient (Church) complained about an alleged confidentiality breach and identified possible sources; CVPH Compliance ran a FairWarning report that appeared to show Larkin accessing many records unusually quickly.
- Larkin was placed on paid administrative leave after being confronted and was terminated on December 28, 2016 based on the FairWarning report and Church’s complaint; she was replaced by a non‑pregnant employee.
- Subsequent audit-trail review and IT investigation showed no improper access by Larkin (background processes on workstations explained the FairWarning flags); CVPH later sent correction letters to patients.
- Procedural posture: Larkin sued under Title VII (pregnancy discrimination and retaliation) and the FMLA (interference and retaliation). Larkin moved for partial summary judgment on Title VII; CVPH cross‑moved for summary judgment on all claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Title VII — pregnancy discrimination | Larkin: termination was because she was pregnant; CVPH’s stated reasons are pretextual | CVPH: decisionmakers either did not know of pregnancy and/or honestly believed she committed a HIPAA breach | Court: summary judgment for CVPH — plaintiff failed to show decisionmakers knew of pregnancy or that CID reason was pretext for discrimination |
| Title VII — retaliation | Larkin: she was retaliated against for protected complaints/activities | CVPH: termination was for legitimate non‑retaliatory reason (suspected breach) | Court: summary judgment for CVPH — no evidence of retaliatory motive |
| FMLA — retaliation | Larkin: terminated for requesting/using FMLA leave | CVPH: termination unrelated to FMLA; based on believed misconduct | Court: summary judgment for CVPH — no showing FMLA leave was a negative factor |
| FMLA — interference | Larkin: CVPH interfered with her FMLA rights by denying restoration/terminating her | CVPH: would have terminated regardless because of the believed breach | Court: summary judgment for CVPH — employer showed lawful, non‑FMLA reason so no interference |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (framework for burden‑shifting in discrimination cases)
- Texas Dep’t of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (plaintiff must show employer’s nondiscriminatory reason is pretext)
- St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (to show pretext plaintiff must show discrimination was real reason)
- Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d 58 (2d Cir.) (prima facie elements for termination cases)
- Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir.) (Pregnancy Discrimination Act treats pregnancy as sex discrimination)
- Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130 (2d Cir.) (conclusory allegations insufficient to defeat summary judgment)
- McPherson v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 457 F.3d 211 (2d Cir.) (focus is on employer’s motive, not truth of misconduct allegations)
- Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161 (2d Cir.) (FMLA interference requires showing leave was a negative factor)
- Graziadio v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 817 F.3d 415 (2d Cir.) (retaliation claims analyzed under McDonnell Douglas)
- Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115 (2d Cir.) (FMLA retaliation analyzed under same burden‑shifting framework)