Lard v. State
2014 Ark. 1
Ark.2014Background
- On April 12, 2011, Jerry Lard shot Officer Jonathan Schmidt during a traffic stop and fired at Sergeant Overstreet; Schmidt later died and Lard was shot and arrested. Methamphetamine was found on Lard and in his system.\
- Lard pled not guilty but conceded the shootings, asserting a mental-disease-or-defect defense (claiming brain damage from childhood injuries or chronic meth use); he introduced neuropsychological testing and a PET scan.\
- The State rebutted with experts diagnosing antisocial personality disorder and presented numerous prior bad-act details (including threats, prior violence, jailhouse statements, and a detailed “Hell Bound” back tattoo) as bases for those opinions.\
- Dash‑camera videos from both officers’ cruisers showing the stop and the shootings were played (including slowed/side‑by‑side versions).\
- Lard was convicted of capital murder, attempted capital murder, and meth possession; he received death, life, and ten-year sentences. He appealed on evidentiary, procedure, and constitutional grounds; the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Lard's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of prior bad acts/character evidence under Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) and 403 | Evidence (warrants, threats, prior crimes, lack of remorse, tattoo, meth manufacture) was unfairly prejudicial and improperly used to show bad character | Evidence had independent relevance (motive, intent, rebuttal of mental‑disease defense) and probative value outweighed prejudice | Court held evidence admissible: portions were independently relevant, proffered to show motive/intent or factual basis for expert diagnoses; one question about meth manufacture was arguably marginal but harmless error given overwhelming evidence |
| Expert testimony and factual bases (including jailhouse statements) offered to rebut mental‑disease/defect defense | Such factual bases were improper character/backdoor evidence and unduly prejudicial | Experts may disclose the facts they reasonably relied on (Ark. R. Evid. 703); factual history was necessary to support antisocial‑personality diagnosis | Court accepted rebuttal testimony and jailer statements as admissible to show basis for experts’ opinions and to rebut brain‑damage defense; found no abuse of discretion and ruled any limited error harmless |
| Photographs of a detailed back tattoo (“Hell Bound”) | Tattoo photos were inflammatory and irrelevant; a simpler proffered drawing should have been admitted instead | Photos were relevant to refute brain‑damage claim by showing planning/abstract ability; experts relied on them | Court held photos admissible as relevant to experts’ assessments; any prejudice did not outweigh probative value |
| Dash‑camera videos (multiple versions, slow‑motion, side‑by‑side) | Videos were cumulative, inflammatory, and intended to inflame the jury; unnecessary because facts were admitted | Videos were objective, corroborative, and helped clarify fast events from multiple perspectives; trial court limited overly inflammatory portions | Court upheld admission and use in argument; probative value exceeded unfair‑prejudice risk; no preservation of objection to closing‑argument use so appellate review limited |
| Sequestration of victim‑impact witnesses under Ark. R. Evid. 615 | Victim’s family remained in courtroom during guilt phase contrary to mandatory sequestration; presence prejudiced sentencing | Court allowed witnesses to remain but limited them to written victim‑impact statements at penalty phase; no substance from them affected guilt evidence | Court found exclusion error but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because testimony was confined to prewritten victim‑impact statements and did not reveal guilt‑phase information |
| Prosecutor’s remarks in guilt and penalty closings | Prosecutor made improper, inflammatory comments, denigrated defense (calling brain‑damage evidence a "ploy"), and urged jury to "send a message" with death penalty | Remarks were argument on evidence; penalty‑phase deterrence comments aligned with sentencing purposes; no contemporaneous objections at guilt phase | Court declined to review most remarks (no timely objections); penalty‑phase comments about deterrence were permissible; no reversible error |
| Ex post facto challenge to death penalty after Method of Execution Act invalidation | With prior execution‑method statute struck, any post‑offense statute prescribing a method would alter punishment and violate ex post facto clause | Ex post facto clause not implicated because death remained a statutory option at time of offense; changes to method are procedural, not an increased quantum of punishment; Dobbert controls | Court rejected claim: existence of capital‑punishment statutory scheme at time of offense provides fair warning; method changes do not increase substantive punishment |
Key Cases Cited
- Hamm v. State, 365 Ark. 647 (discussing Rule 404(b) framework and exceptions) (Ark. Sup. Ct.)
- Vance v. State, 383 S.W.3d 325 (Ark. 2011) (independent‑relevance test for 404(b) evidence)
- Miller v. State, 362 S.W.3d 264 (Ark. 2010) (expert testimony may rely on prior‑act facts to support opinions)
- Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977) (existence of death‑penalty statute at time of offense supplies operative fair‑warning against ex post facto challenge)
- Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981) (two elements for ex post facto: retrospective effect and disadvantage to offender)
- Watson v. State, 308 Ark. 643 (Ark. 1992) (photographic/video evidence admissible when helpful/corroborative despite being cumulative or inflammatory)