Laquer v. Citizens Property Insurance Corp.
167 So. 3d 470
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Laquer owned a furnished condominium insured by Citizens; policy required "prompt" notice of loss and a sworn proof of loss within 60 days after request.
- Hurricane Wilma hit in October 2005; Laquer’s unit was rented and she did not visit it from before the storm until September 2008.
- The condo manager and regular agents inspected the unit after the storm and observed no damage; the tenant did not report damage.
- In September 2008 Laquer first observed warped flooring; in April–May 2009 an environmental contractor found severe mold and evidence suggesting wind-driven rain from the adjacent unit dating to the hurricane.
- Laquer reported the claim to Citizens on May 19, 2009 (over three years after Wilma); Citizens denied coverage for untimely (not "prompt") notice.
- Trial court granted partial summary judgment that notice was not "prompt" as a matter of law, left prejudice to the jury; jury found Citizens prejudiced; Laquer appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Laquer provided "prompt" notice under the policy | Notice is judged from when the insured knew or should have known of damage; Laquer lacked actual or constructive notice until 2008–2009, so timeliness is a factual question for the jury | Three-year delay after a known hurricane is not "prompt" as a matter of law, citing precedents holding multi-year delays untimely | Reversed: whether notice was "prompt" is a jury question here given policy language and facts; summary judgment on that issue was improper |
| Whether the hurricane itself necessarily triggered the duty to notify | Laquer: duty triggers when a reasonable person would believe a claim exists (discovery), not merely the hurricane date | Citizens: known catastrophic event like a hurricane can trigger duty even if damage is later documented | Held: duty is fact-dependent; the hurricane did not automatically trigger the notice duty here because no apparent damage was observable after the storm |
| Whether the prejudice issue can stand alone for retrial | Laquer: prejudice and notice timing are factually linked and should be retried together | Citizens: jury already found prejudice, only notice was erroneous on summary judgment | Held: Reverse and remand for new trial on both notice and prejudice because both turn on the same factual question of when the duty to notify arose |
| Applicability of fixed-time notice cases (e.g., Soronson) | Laquer: policy language here does not set fixed-time notice from date of loss, so Soronson is distinguishable | Citizens: relied on cases finding late notice post-hurricane untimely | Held: Soronson is distinguishable; this policy used the undefined term "prompt," not a fixed-time-from-loss provision |
Key Cases Cited
- LoBello v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 152 So. 3d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) ("prompt" notice generally a fact question; insured may show prejudice absent timely notice)
- 1500 Coral Towers Condo. Ass’n v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 112 So. 3d 541 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (upholding summary judgment where insured was aware of damage shortly after hurricane but delayed years before notice)
- Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Waldrep, 400 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (insured must give notice when occurrence should lead a reasonable person to believe a claim exists)
- Bankers Ins. Co. v. Macias, 475 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 1985) (when notice is untimely, insurer is presumed prejudiced; insured must rebut)
- Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Shoffstall, 198 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967) (terms like "prompt" and "immediate" mean notice within a reasonable time under the circumstances)
- Soronson v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 96 So. 3d 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (distinguishable: policy there imposed fixed-time notice from date of loss)