Lapinski, R. v. Poling, D.
Lapinski, R. v. Poling, D. No. 250 WDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Apr 7, 2017Background
- Appellants (Lapinski, Fitzgerald, Sivy) were active in Economy Borough politics and members of a local campaign committee; Fitzgerald and Sivy were 2013 candidates. Lapinski served as committee treasurer.
- Appellees (Poling, Sisk), county Democratic committee chairmen, sent two letters (Sept. 9 and Sept. 17, 2013) to county election and prosecutorial bodies alleging campaign finance/reporting violations by the Committee and the candidates and asking for investigation.
- The Attorney General investigated but declined prosecution; a local reporter published articles summarizing/quoting the letters.
- Appellants sued Appellees for defamation and false light; Appellees filed preliminary objections (demurrers) arguing the letters were not defamatory and that Appellants, as public figures, failed to plead actual malice.
- The trial court sustained the demurrers and dismissed the complaint; the Superior Court affirmed in part (holding letters were capable of defamatory meaning) but affirmed dismissal because Appellants, as public figures, failed to plead falsity and actual malice and failed to plead the publicity element for false light.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the letters were capable of defamatory meaning | Letters accused Appellants of criminal campaign-finance violations and therefore are libel per se and highly offensive | Letters were formal complaints sent to appropriate officials, expressed opinion and conclusions based on attached evidence, not broad publications | Court: Letters are capable of defamatory meaning (they imputed criminal activity) |
| Whether defendants waived argument that letters lacked defamatory meaning | Poling raised lack-of-defamatory-meaning only in brief/hearing; waiver asserted because not raised in preliminary objections | Defendants argued meaning at hearing/brief and trial court considered it | Moot—appellate court found letters capable of defamatory meaning, so waiver issue unnecessary |
| Whether Appellants adequately pleaded falsity, actual malice, and abuse of privilege (public-figure standard) | Plaintiffs alleged statements were false, made knowingly or with reckless disregard, and no privilege existed; sought discovery into attachments/evidence | Defendants argued Appellants are public figures and complaint lacks particularized factual allegations showing falsity or actual malice; privilege defense implicated | Held: Appellants are public figures and failed to plead sufficient facts to show falsity or actual malice or to defeat any conditional privilege; claims dismissed |
| Whether false light claim pleaded sufficient widespread publicity and falsity | Plaintiffs alleged letters sent to officials and that others were told; website coverage occurred | Defendants: plaintiffs failed to allege defendants caused widespread publicity or that publicity was false; limited recipients were officials | Held: False light claim insufficient—no pleaded publicity to public at large and insufficient allegations of defendants' role in subsequent internet dissemination |
Key Cases Cited
- Tucker v. Philadelphia Daily News, 577 Pa. 598, 848 A.2d 113 (Pa. 2004) (defines defamation/libel standards and public-figure actual malice pleading requirements)
- Marcone v. Penthouse Intern. Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1985) (statements imputing crime are defamatory as a matter of law)
- Agriss v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 483 A.2d 456 (Pa. Super. 1984) (libel defined; adoption of Restatement approach)
- Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1990) (candidates/public figures accept closer public scrutiny; public-figure doctrine)
- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (U.S. 1964) (actual malice standard for public-figure defamation)