Lanvale Properties, LLC v. County of Cabarrus
366 N.C. 142
| N.C. | 2012Background
- Cabarrus County adopted an Adequate Public Facilities Ordinance (APFO) beginning in 1998 to condition residential approvals on school capacity; the APFO evolved from a subdivision-ordinance provision into a broader zoning framework by 2007.
- Early applications involved developer payments (VMPs) of about $500 per unit, later rising dramatically; disputes arose over enforcement, especially in Concord and Kannapolis, with municipalities sometimes annexing developments to circumvent APFO collection.
- In 2004, the General Assembly enacted Session Law 2004-39 concerning enforcement of the APFO; the Board linked the APFO to this law in 2004, and later revisions sought to expand the fee structure.
- From 2003 to 2008 the APFO’s adequate public facilities fee increased substantially (e.g., $1,008 per unit in 2003 to over $8,600 per single-family unit in 2008), making the APFO a major funding mechanism for school construction.
- Lanvale Properties, LLC filed a declaratory judgment challenge in 2008 alleging the County’s APFO exceeded its authority and violated statutory/constitutional limits; the trial court and Court of Appeals rejected Lanvale’s claims, leading to Supreme Court review.
- The Supreme Court ultimately held that the County lacked statutory authority to enact the APFO as implemented, that Session Law 2004-39 did not authorize adopting the APFO, and that Lanvale’s claims were not time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the County had statutory authority to adopt the APFO under general zoning powers. | Lanvale contends County authority exists under §153A-340/341 to regulate land use via APFO. | Cabarrus County argues broad powers under Chapter 153A and 2004-39 authorize the APFO. | No; APFO not within plain zoning authority. |
| Whether Session Law 2004-39 authorized the County to adopt/enforce the APFO countywide. | Lanvale argues the session law provides special authorization to adopt/enforce APFO. | Cabarrus County contends the law only addresses enforcement, not adoption. | Not authorized to adopt; limited to enforcement. |
| Whether the APFO’s voluntary mitigation payments (VMPs) were lawful or effectively mandatory. | Lanvale asserts VMPs are a revenue-driven unjustified instrument; at least the voluntary nature should be honored. | Cabarrus County contends VMPs are permitted as part of a reasonable mitigation framework. | VMPs not lawful as adopted; the APFO cannot rely on them absent express enabling legislation. |
| Whether the action was time-barred by statutes of limitations. | Lanvale filed within a period; the ordinance was revised previously. | County claims accrual under zoning-ordinance limitations. | Not time-barred because APFO was not a zoning ordinance; action survives. |
| If severable, whether the APFO’s non-VMP provisions could stand independently. | Lanvale would sever only the unconstitutional VMP provisions. | Majority rejects severance; treats APFO as invalid as a whole. | Majority did not sever; held APFO invalid as to authority overall. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jones v. Madison Cnty. Comm'rs, 137 N.C. 579 (1905) (county powers constrained by statutes; Dillon’s Rule context)
- River Birch Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 100 (1990) (broad construction of municipal powers under 160A-4; upholds broad reading)
- Homebuilders Ass’n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 336 N.C. 37 (1994) (use of 160A-4 to broadly construe municipal authority; relevance to 153A-4)
- Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 350 N.C. 805 (1999) (plain language of statute governs; caution against overextension)
- Union Land Owners Ass’n v. Cnty. of Union, 201 N.C. App. 374 (2009) (APFO-like ordinances; discussion of authority limits)
- Durham Land Owners Ass’n v. County of Durham, 177 N.C. App. 629 (2006) (invalidated mandatory school impact fee under general powers)
- Amward Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary, 206 N.C. App. 38 (2010) (authority of local governments to impose fees under broad powers; affirmed broad interpretation)