LANTERI v. CREDIT PROTECTION ASSOCIATION, L.P.
1:13-cv-01501
S.D. Ind.Aug 22, 2017Background
- Plaintiff Katherine Lanteri sued Credit Protection Association, L.P. (CPA) under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), alleging CPA continued text messaging after she replied “stop” and called during bankruptcy automatic stay/discharge.
- Plaintiff sought certification of two classes: (1) TCPA Stop Texting Class (texts sent via RingClear where recipient replied with a stop message) and (2) TCPA Bankruptcy Class (calls sent via LiveVox during bankruptcy stay or after discharge).
- Court reviewed Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) requirements and the Seventh Circuit’s ascertainability doctrine requiring objectively defined classes.
- The Stop Texting class as proposed was impermissibly vague (included “message to stop” and a non-exhaustive list of variations), so the court refined the definition to six specific reply texts for analysis.
- Court found commonality satisfied (common question whether an ATDS was used) but denied certification of both classes because the named plaintiff’s reply and bankruptcy facts were not typical of the proposed class members and she could not adequately represent them.
- Court proposed alternative, narrower classes (a one-word “stop” texting class and a bankruptcy stay class) and allowed Plaintiff 21 days to move to certify those; denied the Second Amended Motion to Certify as submitted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ascertainability of Stop Texting class | Class includes all who replied with a “message to stop”; plaintiff argued variations should be included | Defendants argued class definitions vague and create individualized inquiries | Original definition impermissibly vague; court refined class to specific listed reply texts but denied certification on other grounds |
| Commonality (Stop & Bankruptcy) | Common injury: recipients revoked consent and were contacted; common question whether ATDS was used | Defendants contested that common answers exist and raised individualized issues | Commonality met based on single common question: whether an automated dialing system was used |
| Typicality & Adequacy (Stop) | Plaintiff claimed she represents those who revoked consent by replying | Defendants argued plaintiff’s reply differed from class definitions and she is not a class member | Typicality and adequacy failed: plaintiff’s reply (“stop”) did not match refined list; she cannot represent those who sent different reply texts |
| Typicality & Adequacy (Bankruptcy) | Plaintiff asserted she fits the bankruptcy class and bankruptcy filing is public record giving common revocation | Defendants noted plaintiff received no post-discharge calls and thus differs from class members who were called post-discharge | Typicality and adequacy failed: plaintiff did not receive calls after discharge and thus cannot represent those who did |
| Predominance & Superiority | Plaintiff argued common legal issues predominate and class action is superior | Defendants argued individualized inquiries (e.g., reasonableness of revocation) defeat predominance | Court found predominance lacking for Stop class given individualized inquiries into whether each reply constituted revocation; denied class certification |
Key Cases Cited
- Blow v. Bijora, Inc., 855 F.3d 793 (7th Cir.) (describing Rule 23 prerequisites)
- Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802 (7th Cir.) (district courts should refine class definitions rather than deny where possible)
- General Tel. Co. of S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (rigorous Rule 23 analysis and probing behind pleadings)
- Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir.) (ascertainability and objective class definitions required)
- Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (commonality requires a question capable of classwide resolution)
- Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (predominance is demanding for Rule 23(b)(3))