Langfitt v. Federal Marine Terminals, Inc.
647 F.3d 1116
| 11th Cir. | 2011Background
- Langfitt, an Able Body day-laborer, was injured December 13, 2007 while performing longshoring work for FMT under a work order with Able Body.
- Langfitt has received Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act benefits through Able Body's insurer.
- Langfitt filed a negligence action against FMT, arguing FMT employees were negligent; FMT raised § 905(a) as an exclusive remedy defense, asserting borrowing-employer status under § 904(a).
- The district court granted summary judgment for FMT, concluding FMT was Langfitt's employer under the LHWCA and that § 905(a) barred the tort claim.
- The Eleventh Circuit reviews the borrowed-servant framework under the LHWCA to determine which employer is liable and immune, applying a three-part test requiring consent, work performed for the borrowing employer, and right to control.
- Langfitt appeals, challenging whether the district court correctly found consent and control by the borrowing employer on December 13, 2007.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Langfitt consented to borrowed-employment with FMT | Langfitt's consent may be implied by his employment history and voluntary assignment to FMT. | Consent is shown by Langfitt's voluntary acceptance of assignments through Able Body and the day-to-day reality of the relationship. | Langfitt consented to borrowed employment. |
| Whether FMT had the right to control Langfitt's work on the December 13, 2007 assignment | Control may have been exercised by BBC or others, not clearly by FMT. | FM T had the right to control the manner and details of Langfitt's work via the work order and on-site supervision by an FMT supervisor. | FMT had the right to control Langfitt's longshoring work, weighing in favor of borrowing-employer status. |
| Whether Langfitt's work for FMT was essentially the work of the borrowing employer | The record shows Langfitt's tasks aligned with FMT's loading operation rather than Able Body's generic labor supply. | Langfitt's duties were within FMT's project; the relevant work was for FMT's benefit. | Yes; Langfitt's work was essentially FMT's. |
| Whether the three-part borrowed-employment standard was satisfied under the LHWCA | Consent and control alone may not suffice without clear evidence of assignment of work. | All three criteria—consent, work being done for the borrowing employer, and control—are met. | All three criteria were satisfied; FMT is Langfitt's borrowing employer. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ruiz v. Shell Oil Co., 413 F.2d 310 (5th Cir.1969) (recognized borrowed-servant concept in LHWCA; relied on control paradigm)
- Gaudet v. Exxon Corp., 562 F.2d 351 (5th Cir.1977) (consent and control factors; clarified consent may be implied)
- Hebron v. Union Oil Co. of California, 634 F.2d 245 (5th Cir.1981) (emphasized power to direct and supervise as part of borrowing-employer analysis)
- Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215 (Supreme Court 1909) (borrowed-servant framework: whom is the work being done for and who controls)
- Total Marine Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker's Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 87 F.3d 774 (5th Cir.1996) (application of borrowed-servant doctrine to LHWCA context; liability and immunity distinctions)
- Capps v. N.L. Baroid-NL Indus., Inc., 784 F.2d 615 (5th Cir.1986) (consent and control considerations in borrowed employment)
- Meka v. Falk Corp., 102 Wis.2d 148, 306 N.W.2d 65 (Wis. 1981) (consent and nature of relationship in borrowed-employment analysis)