Langenberg v. Commissioner of Social Security
2:21-cv-00887
W.D. Wash.Mar 22, 2022Background
- Plaintiff filed Title II and XVI (SSI) applications on December 31, 2018, alleging onset of disability March 1, 2018; claims were denied and ALJ hearing occurred December 2, 2020.
- ALJ Susan Smith issued a decision on December 21, 2020 finding plaintiff not disabled, concluding severe impairments included multiple sclerosis (MS), mood disorder, and neurocognitive disorder, and assessing an RFC for light work.
- ALJ relied on state-agency opinions and vocational-expert testimony to find plaintiff could perform other work and therefore was not disabled at step five.
- Key contested evidence: consultative psychologist Patricia Kraft, Ph.D., and treating neurologist Richard Mesher, M.D.; plaintiff also challenged the ALJ’s assessment of his subjective symptom testimony and omission of CPP (concentration, persistence, pace) limitations in the RFC.
- District court upheld the ALJ’s discounting of Dr. Kraft but found the ALJ erred in discrediting Dr. Mesher’s opinion and plaintiff’s symptom testimony; errors were not harmless and could affect the RFC and VE hypotheticals.
- Court reversed and remanded for further administrative proceedings, directing the ALJ to re-evaluate Dr. Mesher’s opinion and plaintiff’s symptom testimony and permit additional evidence/testimony as needed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| ALJ's evaluation of medical opinions (Dr. Kraft, Dr. Mesher) | Kraft: ALJ ignored parts of opinion about CPP interruptions and missed work; Mesher: treating neurologist's opinion improperly discounted | ALJ relied on objective records, daily activities, and treatment noncompliance; new regs alter review standards | ALJ permissibly discounted Dr. Kraft (supported by record); ALJ improperly discounted Dr. Mesher (reasons not supported by substantial evidence) |
| Evaluation of plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony | Plaintiff's MS symptoms (fatigue, headaches, vision, depression) were credible and supported by record | ALJ found testimony inconsistent with objective evidence, activities, and inconsistent statements | ALJ erred: relied on cherry-picked record and improper emphasis on lack of objective corroboration; one inconsistency (marijuana) insufficient to discredit testimony wholesale |
| RFC assessment and inclusion of moderate CPP limitations | ALJ should have explicitly incorporated step-three paragraph B moderate CPP limits into RFC | ALJ treated paragraph B as severity rating and performed an RFC for work-related functions | No reversible error on this ground: step-three findings are not RFCs; error (if any) harmless because ALJ must perform more detailed RFC analysis anyway |
| Remedy on remand (award benefits vs further proceedings) | Erroneous discounting of evidence requires benefits or further proceedings | Commissioner urges applying new regs and upholding ALJ decision | Court remanded for further proceedings — record ambiguous and further development may cure errors; did not award benefits |
Key Cases Cited
- Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1995) (standard for rejecting examining physician opinions)
- Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2008) (ALJ may discount an opinion inconsistent with the doctor’s own treatment notes)
- Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2014) (ALJ may not cherry-pick record in rejecting claim)
- Regennitter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1998) (inconsistency with objective medical evidence can be a clear and convincing reason)
- Robbins v. Social Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 2006) (subjective testimony cannot be rejected solely for lack of objective corroboration)
- Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2008) (harmless error framework for administrative decisions)
- Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 2017) (standards for remand for award of benefits)
- Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2014) (three-part test for remand for benefits)
- Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148 (2019) (definition of substantial evidence)
