Langbord v. United States Department of the Treasury, 832 F.3d 170

Background

Ten 1933 Double Eagle gold coins (not issued for circulation) were found by Joan Langbord’s family; the Mint took possession for authentication in 2004 and refused to return them.
The Government contends the coins were never lawfully issued and remain U.S. property (alleged theft/embezzlement from the Philadelphia Mint in 1933); Langbords claim ownership and filed suit seeking return and statutory protections.
District Court found the Mint’s retention violated the Langbords’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, ordered the Government to initiate judicial forfeiture, and later, after trial, entered judgment for the Government, declaring the coins U.S. property.
On appeal the Third Circuit (en banc) considered (1) whether CAFRA’s nonjudicial forfeiture time limits were triggered by the Mint’s conduct, (2) propriety of the Government’s declaratory-judgment/quiet-title claim, (3) evidentiary rulings, and (4) jury instructions about §641 mens rea and temporal scope.
The court affirmed: CAFRA’s 90-day nonjudicial-forfeiture deadline did not apply because the Mint did not commence an administrative forfeiture; declaratory quiet-title relief was permissible and equitable; certain hearsay errors were harmless; jury instructions were proper.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did Langbords’ seized-asset claim trigger CAFRA’s 90-day deadline for the Government to file forfeiture?	Langbord: filing a seized-asset claim started §983(a)(3)’s 90-day clock; failure to file forfeiture requires return.	Gov’t: no nonjudicial forfeiture was ever commenced — the Mint asserted ownership and disclaimed intent to forfeit, so CAFRA didn’t apply.	Held: No. A nonjudicial forfeiture must be initiated for §983(a)(3) to apply; the Mint never commenced such a proceeding, so CAFRA’s 90-day rule was not triggered.
Could Government add a declaratory-judgment/quiet-title claim after years of litigation?	Langbord: CAFRA is a special statutory scheme precluding such a declaratory action; late amendment prejudicial.	Gov’t: declaratory action is independent (quiet title) and equitable; amendment was within district court’s discretion.	Held: Declaratory quiet-title claim was permissible; district court did not abuse discretion in allowing amendment.
Were evidentiary rulings (ancient Secret Service reports; expert Tripp; Barnard materials; Switt’s prior forfeiture) erroneous and prejudicial?	Langbord: multiple hearsay in ancient reports, improper use of Barnard and Switt prior-forfeiture evidence, and expert relaying inadmissible hearsay required new trial.	Gov’t: most documents admissible (ancient-docs exception, Rule 703 uses); errors were limited and harmless given strong admissible proof.	Held: District court erred in admitting embedded hearsay in some Secret Service material and portions of Tripp’s testimony, but errors were harmless given overwhelming admissible evidence proving theft/knowledge.
Were jury instructions on §641 mens rea and temporal application erroneous?	Langbord: instruction insufficient (should require willfulness/knowledge of unlawfulness) and must require offense post-1948.	Gov’t: instruction matched common-law intent requirement and model jury instruction; CAFRA’s retroactivity clause controls so timing of underlying theft need not postdate §641 enactment.	Held: Instructions proper. Mens rea satisfied by "conscious and aware" formulation; CAFRA’s retroactivity and precedent allow forfeiture for pre-enactment predicate offenses when the forfeiture was commenced after CAFRA’s effective date.

Key Cases Cited

Mason v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1977) (Fourth Amendment possessory rights not vitiated by government ownership claim)
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (limitations on government seizures and searches)
United States v. Barnard, 72 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. Tenn. 1947) (replevin action finding a 1933 Double Eagle had not left the Mint lawfully)
Mantilla v. United States, 302 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2002) (seizure alone does not commence forfeiture; limitations analysis)
United States v. $8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (forfeiture “commenced” requires filing; seizure insufficient)
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (§641 requires criminal intent/wrongful deprivation)
United States v. One "Piper" Aztec, 321 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2003) (CAFRA’s retroactivity clause governs applicability of CAFRA amendments)
United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (distinguishing seizure from forfeiture; legal steps required to vest title)