Lane v. Nading
927 F.3d 1018
8th Cir.2019Background
- Adam Lane was on parole and had agreed to warrantless searches as a condition of release; he later stayed at a hotel without parole officer authorization and missed reporting.
- Parole officer Adam Nading and Fort Smith officer Joseph Boyd went to the hotel, had a hotel worker open Lane’s door, and entered without knocking or announcing.
- Inside they found Lane asleep, drugs, and a handgun; Lane signed an affidavit claiming the drugs were his and was convicted in state court; the Arkansas Supreme Court found the officers violated the knock-and-announce rule but declined to exclude the evidence.
- Lane sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a Fourth Amendment knock-and-announce violation and sought to defeat qualified immunity for the officers in their individual capacities.
- The district court denied qualified immunity, concluding (based on some federal authority) the knock-and-announce rule applied to parolees and the officers conceded no exigency.
- The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation, the law was not "clearly established" in January 2015 that the knock-and-announce requirement applied to parolees, so officers were entitled to qualified immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers violated Fourth Amendment by entering without knocking/announcing | Lane: knock-and-announce applies to parolees; officers violated his rights | Officers: entry lawful as parole condition waives ordinary privacy protections / uncertainty exists | Court assumed, for argument's sake, a violation could exist but did not resolve liability on the merits |
| Whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity | Lane: consensus of persuasive authority (including Green) made the rule clearly established | Officers: no controlling authority and no robust consensus; Samson and lack of precedent made law unclear | Held: not clearly established in Jan 2015 that knock-and-announce applies to parolees; qualified immunity granted |
| Whether a robust consensus of persuasive authority existed pre-2015 | Lane: cited Seventh Circuit and several lower courts showing consensus | Officers: single-circuit and lower-court decisions insufficient to place the issue beyond debate | Held: consensus was not robust enough absent controlling authority; single-circuit + district decisions insufficient |
| Relevance of Supreme Court parole jurisprudence (Samson) | Lane: knock-and-announce rule still governs even if parolees have reduced privacy | Officers: Samson indicates parolees have diminished privacy and permits searches, undermining clarity of knock-and-announce application | Held: Samson cast doubt on whether parolees enjoy the same knock-and-announce protections; contributed to lack of clearly established law |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (U.S. 2018) (articulates the "clearly established" qualified-immunity standard and requirement of close precedent)
- Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (U.S. 2006) (parolees have diminished Fourth Amendment privacy; suspicionless searches of parolees permissible)
- Green v. Butler, 420 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2005) (refused a blanket exception to knock-and-announce for parolees; held knock-and-announce applies absent exigency)
- Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (U.S. 2006) (knock-and-announce violation does not automatically trigger exclusionary rule)
- Jacobson v. McCormick, 763 F.3d 914 (8th Cir. 2014) (two decisions from other circuits did not place an issue beyond debate for clearly established law)
- McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2002) (numerous decisions across circuits may still be insufficient to clearly establish a right)