Lane v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection
43 A.3d 821
Conn. App. Ct.2012Background
- Docks and boardwalk on waterfront property at 32 Money Point Road, Stonington, originated in 1937 and evolved through various configurations over decades, with aerial evidence showing long-standing but changing structures.
- Shiling rebuilt a dock in 1988 without contacting the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP); prior owners had limited or no permits through the DEP’s processes.
- Plaintiffs purchased the property in 2004; in 2007 DEP inspected and issued a notice of violation for unauthorized structures extending to tidal waters.
- In 2008, DEP encouraged applicants to pursue a permit under § 22a-361 but plaintiffs applied for a certificate of permission to conduct substantial maintenance, seeking to retain the dock and replace the boardwalk.
- DEP denied the certificate of permission in August 2008, finding the structures were not in prior-to-1939 condition continuously maintained and serviceable, among other criteria.
- Plaintiffs petitioned for a declaratory ruling challenging the notice of violation and denial; DEP issued a March 20, 2009 ruling affirming the denials and interpreting § 22a-363b(a)(2) as requiring continuous maintenance and serviceability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 22a-363b(a)(2) was properly construed | Lane contends the statute exempted pre-1939 structures that were continuously maintained and serviceable. | Gruendel argues the plain meaning requires continuous maintenance and serviceability as interpreted in the ruling. | Statutory language unambiguous; proper to construe; defendant's interpretation affirmed. |
| Whether substantial maintenance eligibility was supported by substantial evidence | Lane asserts the dock/boardwalk qualify for a certificate of permission under § 22a-363b(a)(2). | Gruendel contends pre-1939 structures must be continuously maintained and serviceable; the current boardwalk is not a preexisting condition and ongoing modifications exceed preexisting scope. | Yes; substantial evidence supports that neither structure satisfied § 22a-363b(a)(2). |
| Whether equitable estoppel against the DEP was warranted | Lane claims DEP's inaction or verbal approvals in the 1980s estopped DEP from enforcing permit requirements. | Gruendel finds no agency inducement or reliance by plaintiffs; no authority supports estoppel against the DEP for inaction. | Equitable estoppel claim rejected. |
| Whether the declaratory ruling violated littoral rights | Lane argues denial infringes littoral rights to access deep water. | Gruendel states littoral rights are subject to reasonable regulation and permit requirements; denial does not preclude all structures. | Declaring ruling did not violate littoral rights; permits and regulations appropriate. |
| Whether the second extension of time violated due process / fundamental fairness | Lane asserts denial of a second extension harmed fundamental fairness. | Gruendel concludes the extension did not infringe fundamental fairness; timing decisions fall within agency discretion. | No violation of fundamental fairness. |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 92 Conn. 252 (1917) (statutory meaning and ordinary usage guidance)
- Cannata v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 239 Conn. 124 (1996) (exemptions to statutes strictly construed)
- Francis v. Fonfara, 303 Conn. 292 (2012) (ambiguity test for statutory interpretation)
- Murphy v. EAPWJP, LLC, 123 Conn.App. 316 (2010) (plenary review of littoral rights context)
- Bloom v. Water Resources Commission, 157 Conn. 528 (1969) (littoral rights and regulatory authority)
- Briggs v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 210 Conn. 214 (1989) (credibility determinations and deference to agency findings)
- Knowles-Lombard Co. v. State, 122 Conn. 263 (1936) (littoral rights and state regulatory authority)
- Stefanoni v. Duncan, 282 Conn. 686 (2007) (littoral and water rights framework)