250 So. 3d 360
La. Ct. App.2018Background
- On April 13, 2015, Anna Landry arrived at Leson Chevrolet's covered service bays during rain, stepped from her vehicle onto the ceramic bay floor, and immediately fell, later diagnosed with a broken tailbone.
- Landry testified she did not look at the floor before stepping down, wore flip-flops, observed rain and wet cars, and believed some water may have dripped from her own vehicle; she did not recall seeing any "wet floor" signs.
- Leson employees confirmed it was raining, acknowledged water would likely be present on the service-bay floor, and described unwritten "rainy day" procedures (use of wet-floor signs, porters and a floor-cleaning machine) but produced no written logs showing those measures were used that morning.
- Landry sued under negligence and premises-liability principles and invoked La. R.S. 9:2800.6 (merchant slip-and-fall statute); defendants moved for summary judgment arguing the condition was open-and-obvious and that Landry could not show Leson created or had notice of a hazardous condition.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants; the appellate court reviewed de novo and reversed, finding genuine issues of material fact as to (1) whether a hazardous wet condition existed where Landry fell, (2) whether Leson had actual or constructive notice, (3) whether rainy-day procedures were timely implemented, and (4) whether the service area falls within the statutory definition of "merchant."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court applied an incorrect (heightened) evidentiary standard on summary judgment | Landry: trial court required "concrete" evidence, imposing more than preponderance | Leson: standard applied was proper | Held: No error — the court's use of "concrete" did not show a stricter legal standard; assignment denied |
| Whether Landry produced sufficient evidence under La. R.S. 9:2800.6 that a hazardous condition existed and was unreasonably dangerous | Landry: testimony and incident report show heavy rain and an "extremely wet" floor; disputed facts preclude summary judgment | Leson: condition was open-and-obvious; Landry cannot prove creation or notice of the condition | Held: Reversed — genuine issues of material fact remain on existence/degree of wetness and notice; summary judgment improper |
| Whether Leson had notice or created the condition (actual or constructive notice) | Landry: employees lacked written logs; testimony about procedures raises factual disputes on timely implementation and notice | Leson: no evidence of notice or creation; plaintiff admitted floor was open-and-obvious | Held: Reversed — factual disputes about whether rainy-day procedures were followed and whether constructive notice existed preclude summary judgment |
| Whether La. R.S. 9:2800.6 (merchant statute) applies to Leson's service bay | Landry: statute applies (parties litigated under it) | Leson: statute applies to merchants; implication that service bay is within its scope | Held: Open question — appellate court found a material factual issue whether the dealership's service area meets statutory "merchant" definition, so applicability remains unresolved and must be addressed below |
Key Cases Cited
- Hazelett v. Louisiana-1 Gaming, 210 So.3d 447 (La. App. 5 Cir.) (explaining slip-and-fall proof requirements under La. R.S. 9:2800.6 and applying risk-utility test)
- Bufkin v. Felipe's, 171 So.3d 851 (La. 2014) (articulating the four-factor risk-utility test to determine whether a condition is unreasonably dangerous)
- White v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 699 So.2d 1081 (La. 1997) (plaintiff retains burden to prove statutory elements; merchant not required to prove absence of condition)
- Broussard v. State, 113 So.3d 175 (La. 2013) (discussing the role of "open and obvious" in the risk-utility analysis)
- Frank v. Boomtown L.L.C., 106 So.3d 227 (La. App. 5 Cir.) (use of adjective "concrete" in summary-judgment reasoning without altering plaintiff's burden)