1:16-cv-07619
N.D. Ill.Feb 25, 2019Background
- Landale Signs contracted in April 2016 to buy a crane from Runnion Equipment for $87,625; both parties signed a written contract.
- After contracting, Landale received wiring instructions from email addresses that mimicked Runnion’s domain but misspelled “equipment.”
- Landale ignored one set of fraudulent instructions (April 18) but followed a second set (May 12) and wired funds to an account in Virginia on May 13; by May 16 Landale discovered the fraud.
- Landale alleges a breach of express and implied contract, claiming Runnion failed to protect its confidential information enabling a third-party (John Doe) to divert the funds.
- Runnion moved for summary judgment; the court granted summary judgment to Runnion on the express-contract claim (no contractual confidentiality term or oral promise) and on the implied-contract claim for failure to prove causation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether express contract included a confidentiality obligation | Landale contends contract implied duties to protect payment/customer info | Runnion: written contract contains no confidentiality term; no oral promise was made | Court: No express confidentiality term or oral promise; summary judgment for Runnion on express claim |
| Whether parties formed an implied-in-fact confidentiality contract | Landale: parties’ conduct surrounding transaction created an implied confidentiality agreement | Runnion: no meeting of minds or intent to create such an obligation | Court: assumed arguendo an implied agreement could exist but did not decide formation because claim fails on causation |
| Whether Runnion proximately caused Landale’s loss (causation in fact) | Landale: third-party phishing/hacking must have originated from Runnion’s insecure IT; relied on IT consultant affidavit | Runnion: no evidence its employees disclosed info or that its systems were breached due to its negligence | Court: Landale failed to prove cause in fact; consultant affidavit was speculative and disregarded; summary judgment for Runnion |
| Admissibility/weight of plaintiff’s IT consultant affidavit | Swindlehurst opined breach likely originated from Runnion’s IT after limited review | Runnion: affidavit is speculative, lacks foundation, contains hearsay | Court: affidavit disregarded as speculative and hearsay; insufficient to create a triable issue |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment standard and reasonable jury inquiry)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (party moving for summary judgment bears initial burden)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (U.S. 1986) (nonmovant must present more than metaphysical doubt)
- Spitz v. Proven Winners N. Am., 759 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2014) (elements of breach of contract under Illinois law)
- In re Emerald Casino, Inc., 867 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2017) (Illinois proximate-causation requirement in contract damages)
- Stagman v. Ryan, 176 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 1999) (district courts may disregard speculative affidavits)
- Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979 (7th Cir. 2009) (courts may disregard hearsay in affidavits on summary judgment)
