Lance Poulsen v. United States, 15-3901

Background

Lance K. Poulsen, co-founder and CEO of National Century Financial Enterprises (NCFE), was indicted and convicted in two related federal cases: securities fraud (multiple counts including money laundering) and obstruction of justice/witness tampering. He was sentenced to concurrent 360- and 120-month terms plus restitution.
After direct appeals affirmed his convictions, several co-defendants obtained vacatur of money-laundering convictions based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Cuellar v. United States, which tightened the mens rea for the “designed to conceal” element of money laundering.
Poulsen filed § 2255 motions arguing (1) that Cuellar requires vacatur of his money-laundering convictions; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to raise a Cuellar-based defense; (3) denial of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice when Tyack withdrew; and (4) prosecutorial misconduct violating due process. He also sought discovery and an evidentiary hearing.
The district court denied relief, concluding counsel had in substance raised the relevant mens rea challenge (even if not citing Cuellar), Poulsen failed to show deficient performance or prejudice under Strickland, prosecutorial-misconduct claims were procedurally defaulted, and Poulsen had not shown good cause for discovery or entitlement to an evidentiary hearing.
The Sixth Circuit granted and expanded a COA to review ineffective assistance, procedural-default ruling, and denial of discovery/hearing limited to the ineffective-assistance claim, and affirmed the district court in all respects.

Issues

Issue	Poulsen's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to raise Cuellar at trial	Counsel’s omission was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial because co-defendants’ convictions were vacated under Cuellar	Counsel’s performance was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; the substance of the Cuellar issue was raised and a Cuellar-based challenge would have been futile given the evidence	Denied — counsel’s performance not shown deficient; Strickland test not met
Whether prosecutorial-misconduct and related constitutional claims are procedurally defaulted	Government misconduct and interference caused counsel’s failure to raise these claims on direct appeal, excusing default	Claims were waived for failure to raise on direct appeal; Poulsen did not show cause and prejudice to excuse default	Denied — claims procedurally defaulted; Poulsen failed to show cause and prejudice
Whether Poulsen was entitled to discovery on ineffective-assistance claim	Discovery would reveal facts (e.g., counsel’s awareness of Cuellar) showing deficient performance and entitlement to relief	Poulsen failed to allege specific facts that discovery would yield showing entitlement to relief	Denied — no good cause for discovery; discovery would not change Strickland outcome
Whether an evidentiary hearing was required on ineffective-assistance claim	Factual disputes (e.g., counsel’s knowledge and decision-making) warrant a hearing	Record conclusively shows Poulsen is not entitled to relief; allegations are insufficient or contradicted	Denied — no abuse of discretion; record conclusively forecloses relief

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Poulsen, 655 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2011) (direct-appeal decision discussing trial and evidentiary rulings)
Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550 (2008) (interpreting mens rea for the “designed to conceal” money-laundering element)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance standard)
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993) (prejudice inquiry under Strickland)
Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) (ineffective-assistance claims generally preserved for collateral review)
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (cause and prejudice standard to excuse procedural default)
Ballard v. United States, 400 F.3d 404 (6th Cir. 2005) (examples of deficient appellate counsel conduct)
Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2006) (counsel performance so deficient as to fall below objective standard)