Lambert v. State
435 P.3d 1011
| Alaska Ct. App. | 2018Background
- In 1982 James and Ann Benolken were raped and brutally murdered in Juneau; physical evidence suggested multiple perpetrators. Newton Lambert was tried separately, convicted of Ann’s murder, acquitted of James’s murder; co-defendant Emmanuel Telles was acquitted later.
- At Lambert’s trial the State relied on: Lambert’s fingerprint on a paper bag next to Ann’s body; Lambert’s presence near the scene; two jailhouse informant confessions; microscopic hair comparison evidence linking Lambert; Lambert’s inconsistent statements and a wound/knife circumstantial evidence. Lambert testified he was present but had memory gaps and denied committing the murders.
- Alaska enacted a post-conviction DNA testing statute (AS 12.73) in 2010 permitting convicted persons to seek DNA testing of retained evidence if they identify a theory of innocence and show testing may produce material evidence that would raise a reasonable probability they did not commit the offense.
- Most original physical evidence was gone, but blood and semen samples from Mr. Benolken’s clothing were located at a private lab and Lambert sought testing to (1) exclude him/Telles/victims and (2) potentially identify other perpetrators via CODIS.
- The State opposed testing (contamination concerns and statutory insufficiency). The superior court denied Lambert’s AS 12.73 application, finding Lambert failed AS 12.73.020(7) (court applied Osborne three‑part test) and failed AS 12.73.020(9)(B) because even favorable results would not raise a reasonable probability of a different outcome given the strong evidence against Lambert for Ann’s murder.
- On appeal the Court of Appeals rejected the superior court’s reliance on Osborne but affirmed the denial, holding Lambert failed to show that, even assuming optimally favorable DNA results, those results would create a reasonable probability that the jury would have found reasonable doubt as to Lambert’s guilt of Ann Benolken’s murder.
Issues
| Issue | Lambert's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper standard under AS 12.73.020(7) — must defendant prove testing will conclusively establish innocence? | AS 12.73.020(7) requires only identification of a theory of defense; Lambert argued he met pleading burden. | State argued Lambert had to meet the stricter Osborne three‑part, showing testing would be conclusive. | Court: Superior court erred to apply Osborne; AS 12.73.020(7) requires only pleading a theory, not proving conclusive innocence. |
| Whether proposed testing meets AS 12.73.020(9)(A) — could testing produce material evidence supporting Lambert’s theory? | Testing blood/semen from Mr. Benolken’s clothing could exclude Lambert/Telles/victims or identify other perpetrators, supporting Lambert’s theory of others’ culpability. | State raised contamination/chain‑of‑custody concerns but court found contamination alone not a sufficient basis to deny testing. | Court: Testing could produce material evidence; contamination concerns did not by themselves justify denial. |
| Whether favorable DNA results would “raise a reasonable probability” that Lambert did not commit Ann’s murder (AS 12.73.020(9)(B)) | If testing identified two unknown perpetrators (not Lambert/Telles), it would undercut the State’s two‑person theory and could raise reasonable doubt. | Given the strong direct and circumstantial evidence linking Lambert to Ann’s murder, favorable results from Mr. Benolken’s clothing would be tangential and would not create a reasonable probability of a different outcome. | Court: Held Lambert failed to show that the best‑case favorable DNA results would produce a reasonable probability of a different verdict; denial affirmed. |
| Use of Osborne v. State (three‑part constitutional test) after AS 12.73 enactment | Lambert argued Osborne is superseded by AS 12.73 and should not govern statutory applications. | State relied on Osborne to require near‑conclusive testing outcomes. | Court: Osborne is of marginal relevance after AS 12.73; superior court erred to conflate Osborne with the statutory standards. |
Key Cases Cited
- Osborne v. State, 110 P.3d 986 (Alaska App. 2005) (articulated a pre‑statute three‑part constitutional test for post‑conviction DNA testing)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (defined “reasonable probability” as sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome)
- Risher v. State, 523 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1974) (Alaska standard for prejudice in ineffective assistance claims; contrasted with Strickland)
- Richardson v. Superior Court, 183 P.3d 1199 (Cal. 2008) (applied Strickland reasonable‑probability standard when construing comparable post‑conviction DNA statute)