09-17-00213-CV
Tex. App.Jan 11, 2018Background
- Dr. Steve Jenkins (appellee), a tenured faculty member, sued Lamar University (appellant) alleging retaliation under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) after being denied promotion to Full Professor and tenure.
- Jenkins claimed he opposed the College of Education’s use of the GRE for admissions as an inherently racist admissions criterion, and that opposition motivated adverse action by departmental and university decisionmakers.
- University moved to dismiss via plea to the jurisdiction arguing Jenkins’s claim arises from an admissions practice (not an unlawful employment practice) and thus sovereign immunity was not waived under the TCHRA.
- Jenkins amended his petition to add a UDJA claim and constitutional claims (free speech and due-course-of-law); the trial court denied the University’s amended plea to the jurisdiction.
- The court of appeals reviewed de novo whether Jenkins pleaded a prima facie TCHRA retaliation claim (and whether his UDJA/constitutional claims were viable), and whether sovereign immunity was waived.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Jenkins pleaded a prima facie TCHRA retaliation claim (i.e., engaged in protected activity opposing an unlawful employment practice) | Jenkins argued opposing GRE admissions was opposing a discriminatory practice that limited downstream employment opportunities for minorities and women (thus protected) | University argued GRE use is an admissions/degree requirement (not an "employment practice" or covered "training program"), so TCHRA waiver does not apply | Court held Jenkins failed to show a good-faith, objectively reasonable belief that the GRE admission practice was an unlawful employment practice or a covered training program; no waiver of sovereign immunity |
| Whether Jenkins’s UDJA claim could proceed against the University | Jenkins sought declaratory relief that University violated TCHRA and his constitutional rights | University argued UDJA does not waive sovereign immunity where the claim challenges the University's actions under a statute rather than the validity of the statute itself | Court held UDJA relief barred because jurisdictional waiver under TCHRA was lacking and Jenkins did not challenge a statute’s validity |
| Whether Jenkins’s due-course-of-law claim (Texas Constitution) is viable | Jenkins claimed deprivation of property/due course of law in denial of tenure/promotion | University argued Jenkins lacked a protected property interest in continued employment or in obtaining tenure | Court held the due-course claim was facially invalid because Jenkins failed to allege a protected property interest |
| Whether Jenkins’s free-speech claim (Texas Constitution) is viable | Jenkins argued his opposition to GRE was protected speech on a matter of public concern motivating retaliation | University argued the speech was made pursuant to Jenkins’s official duties (Department Chair) and thus not protected | Court held the speech was within Jenkins’s official duties, so no free-speech protection; claim facially invalid |
Key Cases Cited
- San Antonio Water Sys. v. Nicholas, 461 S.W.3d 131 (Tex. 2015) (governmental immunity principles and TCHRA waiver analysis)
- Prairie View A&M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500 (Tex. 2012) (purpose of TCHRA to address workplace discrimination)
- Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. 2012) (plaintiff must plead facts to state a TCHRA claim to waive immunity)
- Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (plea to the jurisdiction standards; when evidence may be considered)
- Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2007) (leave to amend and jurisdictional pleading principles)
- City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) (UDJA does not enlarge jurisdiction; remedy only when court already has jurisdiction)
- Tex. Dept. of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. 2011) (sovereign immunity bars UDJA actions absent waiver)
- Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015) (facial invalidity of constitutional claims and immunity rules)
- Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (U.S. 1972) (property interest requirement for due process)
- Pineda v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 360 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2004) (elements of a retaliation prima facie case)
- Cox & Smith, Inc. v. Cook, 974 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998) (good-faith, objectively reasonable belief standard for opposing discriminatory practice)
- Caleb v. Carranza, 518 S.W.3d 537 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017) (public-employee free-speech analysis)
