Lakhwinder Latter-Singh v. Eric H. Holder Jr., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 3265

Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the BIA order dismissing his appeal.
BIA held that California Penal Code § 422 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), making Singh removable.
Singh entered the U.S. illegally in 1993 and was granted asylum that year but never obtained LPR status.
Singh was convicted under § 422 for threatening to commit a crime resulting in death or great bodily harm, with the specific intent that the threat be taken as such.
Removal proceedings were initiated in 2004 under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); Singh sought asylum, withholding, CAT relief, and § 209(b)/(c) waiver, all denied, leading to the petition for review.
The Ninth Circuit reviews CIMT determinations de novo, applying Marmolejo-Campos two-step framework and Skidmore deference to the BIA’s reasoning when it is not precedential.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is §422 categorically a CIMT?	Singh argues §422 is not categorically CIMT.	BIA holds and Rosales-Rosales supports that §422 is CIMT.	Yes, §422 is categorically CIMT.
What level of deference applies to the BIA’s CIMT determination?	Singh contends no special deference; seeks Chevron-like review.	BIA’s reasoning is not precedential; Skidmore deference applies.	Skidmore deference applies to the CIMT determination.
Does Singh’s §422 conviction render him inadmissible under §1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)?	Singh challenges CIMT classification and resulting removability.	Court should sustain BIA’s CIMT ruling and removal.	Singh is ineligible for admission due to CIMT.

Rosales-Rosales v. Ashcroft, 347 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. 2003) (holds §422 is an aggravated felony and informs CIMT analysis in part)
Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc; two-step analysis for CIMT determination; deference levels)
Mendoza v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 2010) (identifies de novo review of statute interpretation; CIMT question is legal)
In re Ajami, 22 I. & N. Dec. 949 (BIA 1999) (threatening behavior can indicate CIMT)
In re Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 225 (BIA 1980) (evil/malicious intent as essence of CIMT)
Galeana-Mendoza v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2006) (discusses assessment of conduct’s character to determine CIMT)
Uppal v. Holder, 605 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2010) (limits CIMT analysis for non-specific-intent assaults; aggravating factors may transform)
Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2006) (threats alone may not suffice for CIMT absent sustained fear; §422 distinguished)
Chanmouny v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 810 (8th Cir. 2004) (adopts reasoning that threats to terrorize can be CIMT)
Ryan D. v. People, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (California case interpreting threat statute’s fear element)