Lake v. State
532 S.W.3d 408
Tex. Crim. App.2017Background
- Appellant was convicted of sexual assault of a child, received ten years’ sentence suspended, and was placed on ten years’ community supervision.
- The State moved to revoke supervision; appellant pled not true and a revocation hearing was held before the trial court.
- After testimony, defense counsel announced he rested and asked to make closing argument; the trial judge responded, “I don’t need one,” and denied closing argument.
- The trial court found two allegations true, revoked supervision, and imposed the previously assessed sentence.
- The court of appeals reversed, holding the denial of closing argument violated the Sixth Amendment and was presumptively reversible (i.e., reversible without a harmless-error analysis).
- The Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide whether denial of closing argument in a revocation proceeding is structural error (immune from harmless-error review) and remanded for a harm analysis, holding it is not structural.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of closing argument at community-supervision revocation is structural error | Lake: denial is constitutional error and effect cannot be assessed, so reversal without harm analysis is required | State: no federal structural right to closing argument in revocation; denial is subject to Chapman harmless-error review | Denial of closing argument is not a structural error under Supreme Court precedent; remand for Chapman harm analysis |
| Whether Herring v. New York labels denial of closing argument as structural | Lake: Herring and allied authority imply presumed prejudice and thus structural effect | State: Herring did not apply Chapman or label the error structural; later Supreme Court lists of structural errors do not include Herring | Herring established a Sixth Amendment violation but did not label the error structural; presumption of prejudice in some contexts does not equal structural status |
| Whether cases that presume prejudice (e.g., Cronic) make an error automatically structural | Lake: presumption of prejudice supports automatic reversal | State: presumption of prejudice for Sixth Amendment analysis is distinct from structural-error doctrine for harmless-error immunity | Presumption of prejudice and structural error are not coextensive; Supreme Court has not declared all presumed-prejudice situations structural |
| Whether the court of appeals should have reversed without harm analysis or perform Chapman review | Lake: record prevents meaningful assessment of harm; reversal appropriate | State: record permits harmlessness assessment and the error may be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | Court reverses court of appeals’ structural-error conclusion and remands for a Chapman (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt) analysis; if harm cannot be shown beyond a reasonable doubt, reversal will follow |
Key Cases Cited
- Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (recognized denial of defense closing at guilt phase as Sixth Amendment violation)
- Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (Texas rule that, except for Supreme Court-labeled structural errors, most errors are subject to harm analysis)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (harmless-error standard for federal constitutional errors)
- Cronic v. United States, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (identified circumstances where prejudice is presumed for ineffective assistance analysis)
- Glebe v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429 (2014) (declined to decide whether Herring established that denial of summation is structural and distinguished restriction from total denial)
- Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (addresses due process and counsel in probation revocation contexts)
- VanNortrick v. State, 227 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (illustrates when factual gaps in the record preclude harmless-error findings)