Lair v. Motl
189 F. Supp. 3d 1024
D. Mont.2016Background
- Plaintiffs challenged multiple Montana campaign finance provisions, including 2011 contribution limits in Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-216(1), (3), (5); litigation began in 2011 and proceeded by cross-motions and a bench trial/remand.
- This Court previously enjoined Montana’s vote-reporting and political-civil libel statutes and parts of the corporate contribution regime; contribution-limit claims were tried and decided at bench trial in 2012, then stayed and appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit (Lair II) reversed and remanded, directing application of the Eddleman test (modified to require the only permissible state interest be quid pro quo corruption or its appearance) and instructed this Court to evaluate evidence and whether limits are closely drawn.
- After additional discovery and cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court evaluated whether Montana proved (1) a sufficiently important anti-corruption interest and (2) that the limits are closely drawn (narrow focus, permit affiliation, allow candidates to amass sufficient resources).
- The Court found the State failed to prove the limits further quid pro quo corruption or its appearance and, alternatively, that even assuming an anti-corruption interest the limits were not narrowly focused and prevented candidates from amassing sufficient resources.
- Judgment: Plaintiffs’ summary-judgment motion granted; Montana’s § 13-37-216(1), (3), (5) (2011) declared unconstitutional and permanently enjoined; other ancillary matters (intervenor Hill) were addressed as moot or left to state authorities.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are Montana’s 2011 contribution limits constitutional under the First Amendment? | Limits are facially unconstitutional as they unduly restrict political speech and association. | Limits are valid contributions regulations to prevent quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. | Held unconstitutional; limits violate First Amendment. |
| Does the State show a sufficiently important interest (quid pro quo corruption or its appearance)? | Plaintiffs: State must show real quid pro quo corruption (explicit exchanges) or credible appearance thereof; evidence here insufficient. | Defs: Supreme Court hasn’t precisely defined quid pro quo; appearance or risk suffices; common-sense evidence and historical examples meet burden. | Held State failed to prove existence/appearance of quid pro quo corruption sufficient to justify limits. |
| Are the limits "closely drawn" to the anti-corruption interest (focus narrowly)? | Limits are not narrowly tailored because they were enacted to reduce influence and level the playing field (impermissible purposes). | Defs: Limits target corruption-related risks and leave other means of affiliation intact. | Held limits were not narrowly focused; ballot materials show purpose to reduce influence/level playing field, which is impermissible. |
| Do the limits allow candidates to amass sufficient resources for effective campaigns? | Plaintiffs: Evidence shows many contributors give at the maximum, candidates underfunded; raising limits would materially increase resources. | Defs: Candidates can seek more donors and still run effective campaigns despite limits. | Held limits prevent candidates from amassing sufficient resources and magnify incumbency advantage; fail this prong. |
Key Cases Cited
- Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (U.S. 2006) (illustrative of problems with very low contribution limits)
- Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (U.S. 2010) (limits must be justified only by preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance)
- Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1976) (distinction between expenditure and contribution regulations; contribution limits need only be closely drawn to a sufficiently important interest)
- McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (U.S. 2014) (reiterates limits cannot be justified to equalize influence or opportunities)
- Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (U.S. 2000) (affirmed closely drawn standard for contribution limits)
- Lair v. Bullock (Lair II), 798 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2015) (remanded; directs application of Eddleman test modified to permit only anti-corruption interest)
- Montana Right to Life Ass’n v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2003) (articulated the three-part closely-drawn test for contribution limits)
- Mont. Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright, 226 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2000) (relevant Ninth Circuit precedent on corruption/appearance inquiry)