319 P.3d 356
Haw.2014Background
- Lahaina Fashions (Plaintiff) sold fee/simple interest to Bank-related respondents in 1994 and retained a 50-year lease with a ten-year option to repurchase (the Option) exercisable under stated financial terms; lease recited arm’s‑length negotiation and no partnership.
- Plaintiff later defaulted, sold its leasehold in bankruptcy (2001), and in 2007 sued respondents alleging fraud, conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, and tortious interference.
- At trial the court granted JMOL for defendants on the fiduciary-duty claim; the jury found for plaintiff on tortious interference and answered special-interrogatory Question 7 (statute‑of‑limitations/discovery) “Yes.”
- After the verdict was read, the court discharged the jury, then met jurors in the jury room, recalled them to give a contrary instruction (not to discuss the case) and later conducted an individual colloquy; several jurors said they “misunderstood” the legal effect of Question 7.
- Plaintiff moved to correct the verdict or resubmit Question 7; the trial court denied relief, the ICA affirmed (holding jurors cannot amend a verdict after discharge and juror statements about legal misunderstanding cannot impeach a special verdict), and this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a trial court may recall/undo a jury discharge and allow the jury to amend/clarify answers to a special verdict when the jury is still present or under court control | Court could rescind discharge and resubmit/interview jurors to correct mistakes; preserving jury’s intent conserves resources (cites Duk, Kanahele) | Once a verdict is received, recorded and jury formally discharged the jury cannot amend verdict; if discharged only new trial is available | Court: A jury may be recalled or discharge rescinded when the jury remains in the presence of or under the court’s control; ICA’s categorical rule forbidding recall was too inflexible. |
| Whether juror statements that they "misunderstood" the legal effect of a special‑verdict interrogatory permit correction of the special verdict after discharge | Jurors’ post‑verdict disclosures showing they intended a different legal outcome justify amending/resubmitting the interrogatory | HRE Rule 606(b) and Cabral bar juror testimony about mental processes and bar changing special‑verdict answers based on jurors’ legal misunderstandings; clerical errors are different | Held for defendants: juror misunderstandings of the legal consequences of special‑verdict answers do not justify amending a special verdict; Cabral controls. |
| Whether the court’s ex parte conversation with jurors in the jury room constituted an improper outside influence requiring reversal or new trial | Plaintiff argued the colloquy and court statements influenced jurors and warranted relief | Defendants argue the conversation was limited and the colloquy later was properly conducted; in any event juror legal‑misunderstanding is the controlling problem | Court: Issue is moot — even if the conversation were improper, Cabral and 606(b) mean juror statements of legal misunderstanding cannot be used to impeach the special verdict; outcome stands. |
| Whether the Option/lease created a trust or fiduciary duty such that JMOL on breach of fiduciary duty was erroneous | Plaintiff relied on Weir’s testimony (Bank officer/attorney) and the Option’s terms to show respondents held property subject to duties and owed fiduciary obligations | Defendants: the Option is essentially a contract to convey; vendor‑purchaser relations are not trusts or fiduciary relationships; witness legal conclusions are not probative to create a factual dispute | Held for defendants: no trust/fiduciary duty as a matter of law; contractual duty to convey does not create a trust; Weir’s statements were legal conclusions without probative value, so JMOL was proper. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cabral v. McBryde Sugar Co., Ltd., 647 P.2d 1232 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982) (post‑discharge juror claims of misunderstanding cannot be used to amend a special verdict)
- Kanahele v. Han, 263 P.3d 726 (Haw. 2011) (court may resubmit questions to a jury that is still available to correct inconsistencies and conserve judicial resources)
- Duk v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 320 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (resubmission of inconsistent special‑verdict questions permissible where jury remains available)
- Dias v. Vanek, 679 P.2d 133 (Haw. 1984) (preferred remedy for an ambiguous special verdict is to have jurors return to clarify; if jury discharged, new trial is required)
- United States v. Figueroa, 683 F.3d 69 (3d Cir. 2012) (district court may reconvene jury where it retained control and jurors did not disperse)