Ladmarald Cates v. United States, 882 F.3d 731

Background

In July 2010, Milwaukee officer Ladmarald Cates responded to a disturbance at Iema Lemons’s home; after other officers left, Cates and Lemons were alone in the house and a sexual encounter occurred.
Lemons testified she did not consent, feared Cates because of his size, status as an officer, and possession of a service firearm, and that Cates choked her during intercourse; physical exam showed neck swelling and vomiting but no vaginal trauma; Cates’s clothing tested positive for Lemons’s DNA.
A federal grand jury indicted Cates under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (deprivation of rights under color of law via sexual assault) and § 924(c) (use of a firearm); the government also alleged the conduct amounted to aggravated sexual abuse, which raises the § 242 maximum from one year to life.
The jury convicted Cates on the § 242 count, acquitted on the firearm count, and by special verdict found aggravated sexual abuse but not bodily injury; trial counsel did not object to the government’s proposed jury instruction defining “force.”
After conviction, Cates obtained new counsel; counsel belatedly sought to extend postverdict motion deadlines (denied), appealed only that ruling (affirmed), and later Cates filed a § 2255 petition claiming ineffective assistance for failing to challenge the aggravated-sexual-abuse instruction.
The district court denied § 2255 relief; on appeal the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding the jury instruction misstated the law and counsel’s failures were prejudicial under Strickland.

Issues and Key Cases Cited

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the jury instruction misdefined “force” for aggravated sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1)	Cates: Instruction wrongly allowed nonphysical coercion, threats, or implied coercive power (e.g., disparity in size or status) to satisfy “force,” contrary to statute and precedent	Government: Instruction acceptable or at least any objection was forfeited and harmless	Held: Instruction misstated law; “force” under § 2241(a)(1) means physical force, not psychological coercion or implied threats
Whether trial/appellate counsel were constitutionally ineffective for failing to object/appeal the instruction	Cates: Failing to challenge an obvious legal error was deficient performance under Strickland	Government: Counsel’s omissions should not warrant relief (also argued waiver issues)	Held: Counsel’s failures were deficient because no plausible strategic reason not to object; appellate counsel should have raised it on appeal
Whether Cates suffered Strickland prejudice from counsel’s failures	Cates: A properly instructed jury reasonably might not have found aggravated sexual abuse; without it maximum sentence cap would be one year	Government: Any error was not prejudicial or harmless given the evidence	Held: Prejudice shown—reasonable probability a properly instructed jury would not have found aggravated sexual abuse, given jury’s factual findings (no bodily injury and acquittal on firearm charge)
Remedy: Whether § 2255 relief is warranted	Cates: Vacatur and remand for further proceedings because instructional error + ineffective assistance affected substantial rights and sentence severity	Government: Opposed vacatur	Held: Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with opinion

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
United States v. Boyles, 57 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 1995) ("force" means physical force under § 2241(a)(1))
United States v. Cates, 716 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2013) (prior direct-appeal disposition noted; counsel’s limited appeal criticized)
United States v. Henzel, 668 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2012) (distinguishing “force” and “fear” under sexual-offense statutes)
United States v. Natale, 719 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2013) (plain-error standard requires obvious error clear under current law)