Laderian McGhee v. Michael Dittmann, 794 F.3d 761

McGhee challenged his 2004 Wisconsin state convictions in a federal habeas petition, asserting a Faretta right to self-representation was violated.
Trial began in Milwaukee County; McGhee repeatedly clashed with counsel and sought to discharge counsel and introduce an alibi, while counsel sought to withdraw.
Court denied the withdrawal; McGhee aggressively protested, leading to disruptive conduct and the court employing restraints (stun belt, later belly chain) to control proceedings.
McGhee’s alibi witnesses were not admitted; he contended his right to self-representation was triggered by requests to discharge counsel and to speak for himself.
Wisconsin appellate procedures (Knight petition) govern how ineffective-assistance claims about appellate counsel are pursued; McGhee pursued related claims through Knight petitions.
District court denied relief on the Faretta claim, and McGhee appealed, arguing the state court unreasonably concluded he did not clearly invoke Faretta rights; the Seventh Circuit reviews AEDPA eligibility and state-court decision de novo.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether McGhee clearly invoked Faretta rights.	McGhee clearly desired self-representation via his discharge requests and statements.	McGhee did not clearly articulate a desire to represent himself; statements were ambiguous or for purposes of disruption.	No; the Wisconsin court’s conclusion was reasonable and not an unreasonable application of Faretta.
Whether the Knight petition exhausted the Faretta claim for federal review.	Knight petition procedures sufficiently exhausted the Faretta claim.	Knight route suffices or not; the state court’s handling conformed to Knight.	AEDPA exhaustion satisfied; district court and appellate review proper.
Whether the district court correctly analyzed the Faretta claim under AEDPA.	State court wrongly applied Faretta to McGhee’s statements.	Record shows McGhee did not clearly and unequivocally invoke self-representation.	Yes; the court’s AEDPA decision was reasonable.

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (establishes Sixth Amendment right to self-representation when knowingly and intelligently waivers counsel; clear invocation required)
State v. Knight, 484 N.W.2d 540 (Wis. 1992) (procedural route for ineffective appellate counsel claims in Wisconsin; Knight petitions)
United States v. Jones, 938 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1991) (ambiguous requests do not clearly express a desire to proceed pro se)
Loya-Rodriguez v. United States, 672 F.3d 849 (10th Cir. 2012) (ambiguity in requests to proceed without counsel; multiple reasonable interpretations)
United States v. Best, 426 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2005) (need unequivocal assertion to waive counsel; ambiguity not enough)
Oakey v. United States, 853 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1988) (demand to proceed pro se must be unequivocal)