Lacy Dodd v. Dr. Randall Hines
229 So. 3d 89
| Miss. | 2017Background
- Lacy Dodd consented to a laparoscopy with ovarian cystectomy and possible salpingectomy to treat infertility; she signed a consent form authorizing “such additional surgeries and procedures (whether or not presently unforeseen conditions) considered necessary or emergent in the judgment of my doctor.”
- During surgery the physicians observed ovaries that appeared highly suspicious for malignancy; an intraoperative consult recommended bilateral oophorectomy, which Dr. Hines performed. Postoperative pathology showed benign serous cystadenofibroma.
- Lacy (and her husband) sued the surgeons and clinic alleging the ovaries were removed without consent and asserting claims for lack of informed consent and medical negligence; damages included loss of ability to conceive using her own eggs.
- The trial court limited proceedings to the consent issue, accepted the defendants’ non-expert affidavits explaining their subjective judgment, and granted summary judgment for defendants based on the consent form.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, treating the claim under a battery-based consent analysis and holding the consent form did not conclusively authorize removal of both ovaries; the case was then reviewed by the Mississippi Supreme Court.
- The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: it held a genuine issue of material fact exists on whether Lacy consented to bilateral oophorectomy and reversed the summary judgment, remanding for further proceedings; the Court declined to resolve causation/expert issues at this stage.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dodd consented to removal of both ovaries | Dodd: she was not informed ovaries might be removed and would have refused or sought alternatives; no express consent to oophorectomy | Defendants: the signed consent form authorized additional/unforeseen necessary procedures; their intraoperative judgment made removal authorized | Court: factual dispute exists; summary judgment improper on consent — remand for further proceedings |
| Whether the consent-form clause conclusively authorizes unforeseen procedures | Dodd: the clause is not dispositive for a procedure antithetical to the surgery’s purpose | Defendants: clause unambiguously allowed physicians to perform necessary unforeseen procedures | Court: signature/boilerplate not dispositive given conflicting sworn statements (Cole and Fox guidance) |
| Proper analytic framework: battery vs. informed-consent negligence | Dodd: removal was without express consent (battery analysis appropriate) | Defendants: consent form and physicians’ judgment resolve issue; informed-consent/negligence analysis should apply | Court: battery/informed-consent distinctions noted; resolved on Mississippi precedent that disputes of fact on consent preclude summary judgment |
| Whether summary judgment was proper before discovery and expert proof on causation | Dodd: trial court limited issues to consent; causation/expert matters were held in abeyance and premature | Defendants: argued lack of causation and statute of limitations supported summary judgment | Court: causation/expert issues premature and were not decided; only consent was before the court, so summary judgment on that issue was improper given factual disputes |
Key Cases Cited
- Cole v. Wiggins, 487 So.2d 203 (Miss. 1986) (signed consent not dispositive where patient and physician give directly conflicting sworn accounts; factual dispute on consent defeats summary judgment)
- Fox v. Smith, 594 So.2d 596 (Miss. 1992) (patient is master of her body; consent clause for unforeseen procedures does not automatically authorize substantially different or expressly forbidden procedures)
- Barner v. Gorman, 605 So.2d 805 (Miss. 1992) (consent-form analysis principles referenced by appellate court)
- In re Brown, 478 So.2d 1033 (Miss. 1985) (articulating informed-consent as rooted in the individual’s right to bodily autonomy and privacy)