Lacey v. Ohio Aud. of State
2019 Ohio 4266
Ohio Ct. App.2019Background
- Wanda L. Lacey was New Madison's fiscal officer, tax administrator, and board clerk from 2009–2015 and handled receipts, payroll, and accounts payable.
- Ohio Auditor's Office conducted a special audit/investigation (investigator Nicole Beckwith; audit manager Elizabeth Akers) that reported missing deposits, unaccounted receipts, an undocumented bonus, and unallowable debit-card charges totaling alleged losses of roughly $21,734.89.
- A grand jury returned a single third-degree felony indictment for theft in office; the county prosecutor later dismissed the indictment.
- Lacey sued the Auditor alleging malicious prosecution, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; the Auditor moved for summary judgment asserting absolute privilege and, alternatively, lack of malice/probable cause and no extreme conduct.
- The Court of Claims granted summary judgment for the Auditor, holding the absolute privilege doctrine barred the claims and that Beckwith and Akers were personally immune under R.C. 9.86 and 2743.02(F); Lacey appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Auditor's communications to the prosecutor are protected by absolute privilege (affecting malicious prosecution/defamation/IIED claims) | Lacey: Auditor lacked probable cause; report was defective and not privileged | Auditor: Statements to prosecutor are part of a judicial proceeding and thus absolutely privileged | Court: Absolute privilege applies to communications reporting suspected crimes to prosecutor; Auditor's reporting function protected |
| Whether investigator(s) Beckwith and Akers are entitled to personal immunity under R.C. 9.86/2743.02(F) | Lacey: Investigators acted maliciously or recklessly by overlooking exculpatory records | Auditor: Investigators acted within scope of duties and without malice, bad faith, wantonness, or recklessness | Court: No evidence of manifestly outside scope conduct or of malice/bad faith/wanton/reckless behavior; investigators entitled to immunity |
Key Cases Cited
- M.J. DiCorpo, Inc. v. Sweeney, 69 Ohio St.3d 497 (1994) (statements to a prosecuting attorney about possible crimes are part of a judicial proceeding and may be absolutely privileged)
- Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574 (1941) (distinguishes absolute and qualified privilege; absolute protects even statements made with malice)
- Costanzo v. Gaul, 62 Ohio St.2d 106 (1980) (scope and application of absolute privilege for official/state communications)
- Trussell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 53 Ohio St.3d 142 (1990) (elements required for malicious prosecution claim)
- Froehlich v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 114 Ohio St.3d 286 (2007) (malicious prosecution involves misuse of criminal process)
- Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 111 Ohio St.3d 541 (2006) (definition of "scope of employment" for R.C. 9.86 immunity)
- Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380 (2012) (definitions of wanton and reckless conduct for immunity analysis)
- Foley v. Univ. of Dayton, 150 Ohio St.3d 252 (2016) (malicious-prosecution-type claims cannot be reduced to negligence)